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ABSTRACT 
The United States Department of Defense and development agencies often 
attribute political violence and instability to poverty and a lack of economic 
development.  However, the cases of Morocco and Algeria challenge this popular 
assumption as Morocco is considerably poorer than Algeria, yet enjoys greater 
political stability with less incidences of political violence.  Beyond the traditional 
answers of economic aid and political intervention, these two nations 
demonstrate that national identity is also necessary in establishing more stable 
and sustainable practices. 
 vi 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 vii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................. 1 
A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION ........................................................ 1 
B. IMPORTANCE/RELEVANCE: ............................................................. 1 
C. BACKGROUND ................................................................................... 3 
1. History ...................................................................................... 4 
2. Political Institutions ................................................................. 6 
3. Economic Systems .................................................................. 8 
4. Political Opposition ................................................................. 9 
5. Terrorism .................................................................................. 9 
a. Casablanca .................................................................. 10 
b. Madrid .......................................................................... 11 
c. Marrakesh .................................................................... 11 
d. GSPC/AQIM ................................................................. 12 
D. HYPOTHESES ................................................................................... 13 
E. THESIS OVERVIEW .......................................................................... 14 
II. LITERATURE REVIEW ................................................................................ 17 
A. INTRODUCTION ................................................................................ 17 
B. POLITICAL VIOLENCE ..................................................................... 17 
C. RATIONAL CHOICE .......................................................................... 19 
D. THEORIES OF POLITICAL VIOLENCE ............................................ 20 
1. Poverty Breeds Terrorism ..................................................... 21 
2. Relative Deprivation Theory ................................................. 24 
3. Resource Curse Theory ........................................................ 26 
4. Political Process Theory ....................................................... 29 
E. CONCLUSION ................................................................................... 32 
III. ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ...................................................................... 33 
A. SOCIO-ECONOMIC STANDARDS .................................................... 33 
1. Poverty ................................................................................... 35 
2. Economic Diversification ...................................................... 36 
3. Income Inequality .................................................................. 38 
4. Global Relations .................................................................... 41 
B. CONCLUSION ................................................................................... 43 
IV. POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT ....................................................................... 45 
A. POLITICAL VIOLENCE AND STABILITY ......................................... 45 
B. POLITICAL ISLAM / ISLAMISM ........................................................ 50 
C. GOVERNMENTS ............................................................................... 54 
D. ELECTIONS ....................................................................................... 57 
E. CONCLUSION ................................................................................... 60 
V. CONCLUSION .............................................................................................. 61 
A. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS ................................................................. 61 
 viii 
B. BUILDING AN IDENTITY OF PEACE ............................................... 63 
C. IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE .......................................................... 69 
LIST OF REFERENCES .......................................................................................... 71 
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST ................................................................................. 79 
 
 ix 
LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 1. Comparison of Morocco and Algeria’s GDP per capita (From World 
Bank, 2011) ........................................................................................ 36 
Figure 2. Political Violence in Algeria and Morocco (After SMART, 2011) ........ 46 
 
 x 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 xi 
LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS 
AQIM al Qaeda in the Maghreb 
ENA European Neighborhood Agreement 
EU European Union 
FIS Front of Islamic Salvation 
FLN National Liberation Front 
GDP Gross Domestic Product 
GIA Armed Islamic Group  
GICM Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group   
GSPC Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat 
MENA Middle East and North Africa 
MINURSO United Nations Mission for Referendum in Western Sahara  
OPEC  Organization for Petroleum Exporting Countries 
PJD Party for Justice and Development 
POLISARIO Popular Front for the Liberation of Saqiat al-Hamra & Rio de Oro 
START Studies of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism 
UN United Nations 
USAFRICOM  United States Africa Command 
USAID United States Agency for International Development 
WTO World Trade Organization 
 xii 




 First and foremost, I want to thank my husband, Jason, for scrutinizing 
countless drafts, for taking the early morning shifts with our baby, Tessa, so I 
could work late into the night and for his unwavering faith in me.  I owe my 
stepson, Ethan, some additional playtime for his understanding when I had to 
work instead of play.  I also want to extend a special thank you to my mom for 
taking time over her Thanksgiving holiday to carefully edit my thesis. 
 I would also like to recognize and thank several individuals at the Naval 
Postgraduate School for their support and guidance.  I am grateful to CAPT 
Jennith Hoyt for her professional guidance and insight into balancing work and 
family.  Thank you to Dr. Anne Clunan for offering an outside perspective into the 
intricacies of North Africa.  With my utmost appreciation, I would like to thank Dr. 
Mohammed Hafez for his enduring patience.  He provided valuable insight and 
direction, dramatically improving the quality of my research. 
 Finally, I would be remiss if I didn’t thank my Monterey family.  You 
provided me with the encouragement, confidence and occasional baby-sitting 
necessary for me to complete my Master’s degree.  You always have a home in 
the Fatz house! 
 xiv 




A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
Algeria and Morocco represent a paradox when it comes to the relative 
levels of political violence within each country.  Algeria benefits from the 
production of hydrocarbons; enjoys a significantly higher Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) per capita; boasts much higher literacy rates, and has held 
completely open elections.  Morocco, on the other hand, has minimal petroleum 
and natural gas resources; is ruled by a monarch, and suffers from extremely low 
education levels and economic variables.  However, Algeria suffers from much 
higher qualitative and quantitative levels of political violence than Morocco. If the 
published views of the Department of Defense and international development 
agencies suggest that economic prosperity and higher education will contribute 
to a more stable nation, then how can one explain the inconsistencies with this 
philosophy evident in Morocco and Algeria? 
B. IMPORTANCE/RELEVANCE: 
The cases of Morocco and Algeria are a tangible reminder of a major 
dilemma facing the international community.  Political stability and the 
pervasiveness of violent activism are two critical aspects in the contemporary 
challenge of state-building and development.  However, the popular belief is that 
fighting poverty and improving education are fundamental to promoting political 
stability and subsequently mitigating terrorist activity.  This perspective is not 
limited to the uninformed layperson.  In 2002, President George Bush declared 
the fight against poverty as the “answer to terror”.1   Former World Bank 
                                            
1 George W. Bush, “Remarks by George W. Bush” (speech, International Conference on 
Financing for Development, Monterrey, Mexico, March 22, 2002). 
 2 
President James Wolfensohn has repeatedly argued that sustained peace is 
reliant on the elimination of poverty and provision of economic opportunities.2  
In 2010, United States military leaders still subscribe to this line of 
reasoning as well.  General William Ward, United States Africa Command 
(USAFRICOM) Commander, testified before Congress, “enhancing security 
depends upon…the development of stable and growing economies to undercut 
the recruiting activities of violent extremist organizations.”3  The U.S. Army 
proposes that the “U.S. counterterrorism strategy should include economic 
policies that encourage development, more open societies, and opportunities for 
better living.”4  Agencies dedicated to state development also encourage 
economic improvement as a method to quell political violence.5  
Despite the sound bites from influential diplomats, military leaders and 
development agencies, Algeria and Morocco simply do not fit this archetype.  In 
fact, few nations do.  Regardless, the stabilization policies of the United States, 
European Union, and United Nations continue to target poverty and education.6   
One has to ask, why is there a disconnect between policy and reality?  This 
thesis will attempt to bridge that very gap. 
                                            
2 James D. Wolfensohn "Interview with James D. Wolfensohn on Peace and Poverty: Ten 
Years at the Bank," The World Bank. May 25, 2005. 
http://discuss.worldbank.org/content/interview/detail/2058/ (accessed September 8, 2010). 
3 William E. Ward, USAFRICOM 2010 Posture Statement (Stuttgart: U.S. Africa Command 
Public Affairs Office, 2010). 
4 Miemie Byrd, "Combating Terrorism: A Socio-Economic Strategy," Joint Force Quarterly 41, 
(2006): 15–19. 
5 James Clad, USAID’s Role in the War on Terrorism, (Washington DC: USAID Bureau for 
Policy and Program Coordination, 2001). 
6 United States Institute of Peace, Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction, 
(Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2009); George W. Bush, “Management 
of Interagency Efforts Concerning Reconstruction and Stabilization” (Washington, DC: The White 
House, 2005), Gordon England, “Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition and 
Reconstruction Operations” DOD Directive 3000.5 (Washington, DC: US Department of Defense, 
2005); United Nations General Assembly. "Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy." UN Action to 
Counter Terrorism. http://www.un.org/terrorism/strategy-counter-terrorism.shtml#resolution 
(accessed September 1, 2010); The European Consensus on Development, "General 
Development Framework" November 28, 2007, 
http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/development/general_development_framework/r12544_e
n.htm (accessed September 1, 2010). 
 3 
Morocco has the very characteristics of a nation that presumably make it 
more susceptible to terrorist activity, yet Morocco exhibits substantially lower 
levels of political violence than Algeria and remains one of the United States’ 
most important allies in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA).  Algeria’s 
population is wealthier, more educated but it is also the only state in North Africa 
with a history of mass insurgency resulting in as many as 200,000 lives lost as 
recently as the mid-1990s.7   In addition, the regional organization al Qaeda in 
the Maghreb (AQIM) continues to base its operations out of Algeria.8  
These two nations demonstrate the need to reexamine the root causes of 
terrorism, violent militancy and political instability.  Doing so will result in a more 
realistic and effective approach to counterterrorism and stabilization policies at all 
levels.  Economic growth and development are certainly important, but this thesis 
will show that economics is rarely sufficient in effecting improvements in political 
stability and internal conflict.  While this research is focused on North Africa, the 
implications can be applied to other struggling regions as well as future nation 
building projects. 
C. BACKGROUND 
Algeria has a history steeped in violent insurgencies and mass rebellions.  
It is North Africa’s “largest, richest (and) most repressive” nation.9  However, 
Morocco, while having suffered sporadic violent episodes, has enjoyed a 
comparatively peaceful environment.  This directly conflicts with the popular 
expectation that Morocco, with a poorer and less educated population, should be 
more unstable and overrun by violent action.  Morocco and Algeria were chosen 
as the case studies for this thesis because of their similar backgrounds.  They 
                                            
7 Salima Mellah, "Massacres in Algeria 1992–2004," Algeria Watch, November 2004, 
www.algeria-watch.org/pdf/pdf_en/massacres_algeria.pdf (accessed September 6, 2010). 
8 National Counterterrorism Center, "Al-Qa‘ida in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb," National 
Counterterrorism Center, http://www.nctc.gov/site/groups/aqim.html (accessed September 9, 
2010). 
9 Jeremy Keenan, "Security & Insecurity in North Africa," Review of African Political Economy 
33, no. 108 (Jun 2006): 285. 
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also present a challenge to a popular explanation for political violence, that 
poverty breeds terrorism.  This section will provide a brief overview of the two 
case studies in several key areas: history, political institutions, economic 
systems, and political opposition. 
1. History 
The method by which Morocco and Algeria were colonized and 
subsequently achieved independence informed their perceptions of an 
acceptable level of violence.  This in turn has potentially shaped the identity of 
the people and their threshold for violent mobilization.  Prior to colonization, 
Morocco and Algeria were Arab nations with significant Berber minorities.  Both 
nations were eventually colonized by the French, Algeria in 1830 and Morocco 
eighty years later in 1912.10   Debt repayments played a considerable role in the 
French incursions, as Morocco’s monarch was heavily indebted to its overseas 
allies and required a bailout from the French.11  Algeria was engaged in 
disagreements over debt repayments to the French and the confrontations led to 
France’s invasion and a four-decade battle for control.12 
Despite France’s initial assumption that Morocco would fall to the colonial 
power with little effort, Morocco’s tribal people “refused to submit gracefully”.13   
The outcome of all of the fighting was a French protectorate in Morocco and 
French administrative provinces established in Algeria.  While the French 
                                            
10 Azzedine Layachi, "Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria," in The Government and 
Politics of the Middle East and North Africa, by David E. Long and Bernard Reich, (Boulder: 
Westview Press, 2007), 489. 
11 White, Gregory W. "Kingdom of Morocco." in The Government and Politics of the Middle 
East and North Africa, ed. by David E. Long, Bernard Reich and Mark Gasiorowski, (Boulder: 
Westview Press, 2007), 457. 
12 Layachi, "Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria," 489. 
13 C. R. Pennell, Morocco: From Empire to Independence, (Oxford: Oneworld Pubications, 
2003), 142. 
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excluded the native Algerians from mainstream society, the territory was 
considered as much French as France itself.14 
The 1920s were a decade of passive disagreement with French and 
Spanish rule.  While those in the Rif region were fairly organized, opposition 
amongst the rest of Moroccans was infrequent and small-scale.  The opposition 
to colonial rule grew in the next decade and a violent campaign ensued between 
1930 and 1935.15   Morocco finally achieved independence on March 2, 1956 
and reinstated its pre-colonial regime as the foundation for its new post-
independent government.  It is now recognized as one of the oldest recognized 
nations in the Middle East and North Africa.  While Morocco’s war for 
independence was not as brutal as Algeria’s, this is in part because France was 
fighting two colonies and made the decision to eventually cut its losses in 
Morocco.  The Moroccan tribes also proved to be more resistant than the French 
credited them for, leading to the French being overwhelmed by nationalist 
opposition forces.16    
While the French had initially considered assimilating Algerians into 
French society, this mentality changed in the years following France’s invasion.  
The primary reason can be attributed to the Frenchmen’s fear of Algerians 
hijacking French culture and society and overwhelming the “‘real’ French 
population.”17  Under French occupation, Algerians were treated as substandard 
citizens as the French assumed the mindset that “with such wild beasts the only 
law is that of the noose.”18  Divisions between the colonizer and the colonized 
quickly intensified until they exploded into the Algerian Civil War in 1954. 
                                            
14 William R. Polk, "The Algerian War for National Independence," in Violent Politics: A 
History of Insurgency, Terrorism & Guerilla War, From the American Revolution to Iraq, (New 
York: HarperCollins Publishers, 2007), 131. 
15 C. R. Pennell, Morocco since 1830: A History, (New York: New York University Press, 
2000): 211, 216. 
16 Pennell, Morocco: From Empire to Independence, 159–160. 
17 Pennell, Morocco Since 1830: A History, 158. 
18 John Ruedy, Modern Algeria: The Origins and Development of a Nation, (Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press, 2005), 79. 
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The battle for independence played out differently within each nation and 
began to shape the political environment for decades to come.  The post-
independence political environment of each nation is reflective of the battle for 
independence and the succeeding regimes. 
2. Political Institutions 
In the aftermath of colonization, Morocco and Algeria were left to establish 
effective governance.  In a manner unique to the region, Morocco maintained its 
pre-colonial regime even after independence. Political institutions are an 
influential factor on the frequency and scale of political violence in a given state.  
The respective regimes in Morocco and Algeria are quite different and may 
account for the variance in political violence in each country. 
Morocco is a constitutional monarchy, and is currently ruled by the Alawite 
dynasty. Its first constitution was created in March 1972 and has undergone at 
least three significant revisions.  Unlike many other MENA nations, Morocco 
allows the participation of political parties, with eight major political parties 
currently active.19 
The first constitution, while giving some power to the people, also allowed 
the monarchy to retain the ability to declare full control in situations the monarchy 
deemed appropriate.  Such an incident occurred only two years after the 
country’s first elections.  In the wake of violent riots in one of Morocco’s largest 
cities the current ruler, King Hassan took advantage of a special provision in the 
young constitution and assumed full power.20  He chose to eliminate political 
opposition and was subsequently threatened by two coup attempts.  These 
coups were unsuccessful, both in assassinating King Hassan, and promoting 
                                            
19 Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, "Background Note: Morocco," April 20, 2011, 
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5431.htm (accessed May 5, 2011). 
20 White, “Kingdom of Morocco,” 461. 
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political freedoms.  In light of the attempted assassinations, King Hassan was 
even more persistent in minimizing social and political liberties.21  
When King Hassan II passed in 1999 and was succeeded by his son, King 
Mohammed VI, Morocco enjoyed a great deal of political openings.  Since then, 
Morocco has also been working with the International Center of Transitional 
Justice (ICTJ) to make reparations for past human rights abuses.22   In addition, 
the most recent revision of Moudawana, Morocco’s Family Code, has improved 
the rights of women within their own families in addition to society as a whole.23  
Since King Mohammed VI took the throne, Morocco has enjoyed little terrorist 
activity with the exception of the 2003 Casablanca bombings and the recent 
Marrakesh bombings in April 2011.24 
Algeria commenced its revolution on November 1, 1954 and finally 
achieved its independence on July 5, 1962.  Algeria’s constitution has undergone 
many revisions since its creation on September 8, 1963.  The most recent of the 
six revisions went into effect on November 12, 2008.25  Abdelaziz Bouteflika has 
been sitting as the elected President of Algeria since April 28, 1999.  Since 
establishing itself as a social republic post-independence,  Algeria has 
experienced extended periods of severe state repression.  The nation’s people 
were victim to government repression and corruption through the late 1970s to 
the late 1980s.  As this repression coincided with the expansion of Islamism, the 
people began to riot against the government’s mistreatment.  Finally, the 
government responded with political liberalization.  The problem was that it was 
                                            
21 White, “Kingdom of Morocco,” 461. 
22 The International Center for Transitional Justice, "Truth and Reconciliation in Morocco," 
ICTJ, http://ictj.org/sites/default/files/ICTJ-Morocco-TRC-2009-English.pdf, (accessed June 30, 
2011). 
23 Morocco’s Family Code, Royal Edict n° 1.04.22, Law n° 70.03. 
24 Dalia Dassa Kaye, et al., More Freedom, Less Terror? Liberalization and Political Violence 
in the Arab World, (Santa Monica: The RAND Corporation, 2008), 152–153. 
25 “Algeria,” The World Factbook 2011, (Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency, 2009) 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/index.html. 
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too late; the Islamist parties had already begun to radicalize.  At this point in the 
game, political openness only gave Islamists an in to ruling the government.26 
3. Economic Systems 
Algeria is considered a “bunker” state by Henry and Springborg, and is 
guilty of limiting the “freedom of information or autonomy of economic action 
necessary for globally competitive economic growth.”27  Like other bunker states, 
Algeria is often at the mercy of the global petroleum markets and so its people 
react passionately to the market changes.  In return, they are more likely to 
accept greater levels of political subjugation.  However, when revenues are low 
and states are unable to fulfill their end of the social contract, the public is more 
apt to demand economic diversification and political accountability.28  
Unfortunately, states like Algeria are often “too weak to respond quickly and 
dramatically to opportunities that policy changes…might offer.”29 
Henry and Springborg categorize Morocco as a “globalizing monarchy”.30  
Morocco, like other nations in this category, is better positioned to appreciate the 
benefits of globalization in comparison to bunker states.  Globalizing monarchies 
in the region are more proactive in integrating their economies into the global 
market.  They have stronger private sectors and are more interested in attracting 
foreign capital.31  It is possible that globalization has a positive impact on political 
stability as evidenced by Morocco and Algeria. 
                                            
26 Mohammed M. Hafez, "Political Repression and Violent Rebellion in the Muslim World," in 
The Making of a Terrorist: Recruitment, Training and Root Causes, (Westport: Praeger Security 
International, 2006): 81. 
27 Clement M. Henry and Robert Springborg, Globalization and the Politics of Development 
in the Middle East, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 114. 
28 Ibid., 116. 
29 Ibid., 114. 
30 Ibid., 212. 
31 Ibid., 212–213, 218. 
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4. Political Opposition 
By far, Algeria has significantly more incidents of violence in comparison 
to Morocco.  In raw numbers, Algeria has witnessed 2,357 instances of political 
violence compared to Morocco’s 46 incidents.32  In addition to the quantity, the 
nature of each incidence plays into the reaction of each country.  Violence in 
Morocco is typically initiated by groups external to that nation, meaning the public 
is more prone to understanding, and even welcoming, a quick and decisive 
backlash from the government.  However, Algeria has witnessed more uprisings 
from within the society, juxtaposing the government against the people and 
creating a hostile environment and a dichotomy between the state and its people. 
Anti-colonial movements in Algeria drew on an Islamic identity to 
demonize the French whereas Moroccans developed a more nationalist 
identity.33  These identities have continued to develop in the decades since 
independence.  It is not that Islam is the root of violent political opposition, but 
rather than there is no other unifying identity amongst Algerians.  They do not 
have a sense of national unity as their culture was destroyed during 
colonialization.  Islam is the one characteristic that survived colonialism and 
represents a rejection of Western influence. 
Political opposition in Morocco has tended to be more reserved and 
simultaneously respectful of the monarchy.  Algerian political opposition is cynical 
of its military rulers and instead relies on violent action to express their 
dissatisfaction. 
5. Terrorism 
The episodes of violence in each nation differ not only in quantity, but also 
in the nature of the violence.  The majority of political violence in Morocco stems 
                                            
32 National Consortium for START, (2011), Global Terrorism Database Algeria, 
http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd; National Consortium for START, (2011). Global Terrorism 
Database Morocco, http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd, Accessed September 9, 2010. 
33 Pennell, Morocco: From Empire to Independence, 159–160. 
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from transnational terrorist attacks.  This actually generates a unified nation 
against violence as external actors victimize the entire state.  However, political 
violence in Algeria is often the result of clashes between internal actors, typically 
the state and the people.  Even in the case of terrorism, Algeria has been known 
to harbor terrorists, complicating how the public interprets terrorist attacks within 
Algeria’s borders.  The following section outlines some of the more prominent 
recent cases of terrorist violence in each nation in order to illustrate how the 
different perpetrators influence the national response to said violence. 
a. Casablanca 
Morocco’s history of violence is not nearly as torrid as its Arab and 
African neighbors.  This is not to say that it has never been rocked by the 
violence of domestic terrorism or other forms of political violence; just 
significantly less so.  The most prominent terrorist attacks include the 2003 
Casablanca bombings, the Madrid train bombings in 2004 and the recent April 
2011 bombings in Marrakesh. 
On May 16, 2003, Salafia Jihadiya successfully coordinated 
multiple attacks in Casablanca and killed over forty civilians while injuring nearly 
one hundred more.34  Salafia Jihadiya is an extremist faction associated with Al 
Qaeda and Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group (GICM).  At a time when 
Morocco was defending the West in the wake of 9/11, the nation became a target 
for Islamic extremists and followers of Osama bin Laden.35  The attack in 
Casablanca is the largest and most deadly terrorist attack within Morocco’s 
borders.  These attacks motivated King Mohammed IV to tighten up his political 
controls but actually helped moderate the Party for Justice and Development 
                                            
34 Tim Connors, "Analysis: May 16, 2003 Suicide Bombings in Casablanca, Morocco." The 
Center for Policing Terrorism - Manhattan Institute, http://www.cpt-mi.org/pdf/Casablancav2.pdf, 
(accessed February 06, 2010). 
35 Carol Migdalovitz, Morocco: Current Issues, CRS Report for Congress (Washington DC: 
Congressional Research Service, 2010): 2. 
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(PJD) in their stance on international terror as well as domestic family values.36  
Where most expected the Islamists to radicalize, the opposite was observed. 
b. Madrid 
The GICM, a terrorist organization suspected of having ties with al 
Qaeda, financed the 2004 Madrid bombings that killed more than 200 people 
with profits from drug trafficking.37  The bombings cost roughly 50,000 Euros and 
were completely funded by illicit hashish and ecstasy sales, but perhaps the most 
damning finding from the post-bombing investigation was that several of the 
terrorists were known criminals, some even on the Spanish payroll as 
informants.38   The perpetrators were also predominantly Moroccan expatriates.  
This attack demonstrates a trend of Moroccans engaging in violent behavior 
abroad more so than at home. 
c. Marrakesh 
In April 2011, Marrakesh was rattled by a bombing responsible for 
the death of seventeen people, the majority of whom were tourists.39  This was 
the first major terrorist attack in Morocco since the 2003 bombings and came in 
the aftermath of the Spring 2011 Arab revolutions occurring throughout North 
African and the Middle East.  While there was some speculation that AQIM was 
responsible and was attempting to reclaim public attention, this assumption was 
                                            
36 Eva Wegner, "Islamist Inclusion and Regime Persistence: The Moroccan Win-Win 
Situation," in Debating Arab Authoritarianism: Dynamics and Durability in Nondemocratic 
Regimes, by Oliver Schlumberger, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007): 83–84. 
37 Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, “Country Reports on Terrorism,” 
(Washington DC: US Department of State, 2009): 311. 
38 John Rollins, Liana Sun Wyler, and Seth Rosen, International Terrorism and Transnational 
Crime: Security Threats, US Policy and Considerations for Congress, (Washington DC: 
Congressional Research Service, 2010): 19–20. 
39 "Marrakech Bomb Suspects Arraigned in Rabat," Magharebia, May 18, 2011, 
http://www.magharebia.com/cocoon/awi/xhtml1/en_GB/features/awi/newsbriefs/general/2011/05/
18/newsbrief-01, (accessed June 14, 2011). 
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quickly refuted.  The bomber found responsible was an AQIM hopeful but with no 
official ties to the regional organization.40 
d. GSPC/AQIM 
Algeria has long been home to terrorist activity.  The Salafist Group 
for Preaching and Combat (GSPC) first emerged during the Algerian Civil War in 
the 1990s.  As the Islamic Salvation Army (AIS) and the Armed Islamic Group 
(GIA) militant groups began to phase out, the GSPC succeeded the GIA leader 
and assumed the role of the local terrorist group.41  The GSPC used terrorist 
attacks to intimidate political actors and influence public policy.  Their main 
targets were typically “security services, gendarmeries, commissariats, or city 
halls.”42   It was in the mid-2000s when the GSPC began to reference al Qaeda, 
indicating a shift in loyalties and group structure.43   It is possible that because of 
the publicity and fear associated with the name “al Qaeda”, the GSPC saw 
opportunity for further expansion and strength in assimilating into the local 
organization, AQIM.44 
AQIM has been active in Algeria for over four years and primarily 
operates out of the southern region of the nation.  It has factions that spread 
across the Maghreb, but the Algerian government has been known to turn a blind 
eye to their operations, thus offering a safe haven within its borders.45  AQIM 
continues to focus on political and civilian targets but has weakened in strength 
and influence within the region. 
                                            
40 Thierry Oberle, “The Incredible Story of Terror Marrakech,” trans. by Google, 
http://www.lefigaro.fr/international/2011/05/06/01003-20110506ARTFIG00667-l-incroyable-
histoire-du-terroriste-de-marrakech.php, (Accessed 15 June 2011). 
41 Jean-Luc Marret, "Al-Qaeda in Islamic Maghreb: A "Glocal" Organization," Studies in 
Conflict and Terrorism, (2008): 546. 
42 Jean-Luc Marret, "Al-Qaeda in Islamic Maghreb," 546. 
43 Ibid., 550. 
44 Ibid., 543. 
45 Jean-Pierre Filiu, "The Local and Global Jihad of al-Qa‘ida in the Islamic Maghrib," Middle 
East Journal 63, no. 2 (2009): 213–226. 
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D. HYPOTHESES 
Morocco and Algeria both maintain the largest populations in North Africa 
and are predominantly Arab-Muslim countries with a Berber sub-group and 
similar Judeo-Christian minorities.  They were both French colonies and 
achieved independence around the same time, albeit Algeria suffered from a 
much more violent secession.  While neither country could be considered a 
democracy, both have experimented with democratization.  Additionally, they 
both have vibrant Islamic movements that are popular with the general 
population. 
There are three hypotheses that will be discussed and examined within 
this thesis.  The first is that greater economic diversification results in greater 
political stability.  Morocco has minimal hydrocarbon stores and so agriculture 
and services make up a much higher proportion of its economy than the 
industrial sector.  In contrast, Algeria’s economy relies heavily on its hydrocarbon 
industry.  It is possible that a heavier reliance on one volatile good could result in 
greater political instability and violent militancy. 
The second hypothesis examines the relationship between income 
inequality and relative political violence.  It is possible that the feelings associated 
with having less than one feels they deserve could manifest into feelings of angst 
and frustration, eventually leading to an outburst against the “haves” and the 
state that contributes to such inequality.  This hypothesis would expect 
Moroccans, while poorer than their Algerian neighbors, to be more equal based 
on the country’s lower rates of political violence. 
The third hypothesis suggests that states allowing for greater political 
access to all interested groups will enjoy more stable and secure nations.  This 
may seem counterintuitive as only Algeria allowed its Islamist parties to freely 
participate in the 1992 elections, but the sudden cancellation of the second round 
led to mass revolt and tens of thousands killed.  However, Morocco has enjoyed 
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relative peaceful relations as it has tentatively permitted Islamist parties to 
participate in government and has also improved its political violence record. 
The main primary sources for this thesis will be gathered from the World 
Bank and publications from the United States Department of State, United 
Nations and the European Union.  Data and publications from the Governments 
of Morocco and Algeria will be used to corroborate data from the aforementioned 
bodies. 
E. THESIS OVERVIEW 
Algeria and Morocco present a fitting study for comparative analysis 
based on their similar history and demographics.  Thus, as best as can be done 
in social sciences, they present a case where everything else being equal, we 
can narrow down the explanatory factors for political violence and terrorist 
attacks. 
This thesis is divided into five chapters.  The second chapter reviews the 
relevant literature on the major existing theories of political violence and analyzes 
their applicability to the current study.  Chapter III will analyze the economic 
aspects of each nation and assess the ability of economic variables to explain 
why Morocco is more stable than Algeria.  Chapter IV will address the political 
aspects of each nation and analyze the political access theory as it applies to 
Morocco and Algeria.  Chapter V will summarize the findings of this thesis as well 
as suggest that national identity is a critical aspect in addressing the problem of 
political violence. 
Political access and economic reform are important components to lower 
levels of political violence; however, a strong national identity is also necessary in 
establishing more stable and sustainable practices.  National identity is an 
important determining factor into how a nation will perceive and use political 
violence to achieve political goals.  National history and experiences will inform 
its people’s views on the appropriate use of violence.  Instituting reform without 
addressing the unique nuances of national identity will result in a failure of policy 
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and possibly greater political violence.  Political freedoms help explain political 
violence, but must also incorporate national identity and perspectives in order to 
better counter political violence and preserve peace and order. 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Existing theories on political violence have been developed and refined for 
decades.  They attribute political violence to everything from poverty to political 
repression.  The major theories that are most often referenced in the study of 
political violence will be reviewed and analyzed within this chapter in order to 
better understand the problem set presented by Morocco and Algeria. 
B. POLITICAL VIOLENCE 
Political violence is a term that continues to evolve in the realm of political 
science.  In 1970, Ted Robert Gurr defined political violence as “all collective 
attacks within a political community against the political regime, its actors…or its 
policies.”  He added that the use of force, force being the “use or threat of 
violence by any party or institution to attain ends within or outside the political 
order”, is inherent to all forms of political violence.46  This conflicts with others 
who define political violence as non-institutionalized coercive or threatening 
interactions between citizens and states.”47  Still others articulate political 
violence as “the intentional use of illegitimate force (actual or threatened) with 
arms or explosives, against a person, group, community, or state that 
undermines people-centered security and/or sustainable development.”48 
Nicholas Sambanis theorizes that strategy, not tactics, is what 
differentiates the different types of political violence.  Terrorist and riot violence 
are more strategies of intimidation whereas civil war and genocide are more 
                                            
46 Ted Robert Gurr, Why Men Rebel, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970): 3–4. 
47 J. Craig Jenkins and Kurt Schock, "Globa Structures and Political Processes in the Study 
of Domestic Political Conflict," Annual Review of Sociology 18 (1992): 162. 
48 Elisabeth Gilgen, Keith Krause and Robert Muggah, "Measuring and Monitoring Armed 
Violence: Goals, Targets and Indicators," in Oslo Conference on Armed Violence (Oslo: 
Secretariat of the Geneva Declaration on Armed Violence and Development and the United 
Nations Development Programme, 2010): 5. 
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strategies of control.49  Based on their differing strategies and objectives, 
Sambanis goes on to argue that effective counter policies will also differ.  The 
implication is that terrorism will be more responsive to political liberalization 
rather than improvements exclusive to the socioeconomic sphere.50 
Mohammed Hafez points out that political violence is not a concrete term 
that has a single definition. He uses the case of Algeria to illustrate how political 
violence can adapt to changing circumstances.  “Political violence in Algeria 
initially took on the form of clashes with security forces and assassinations of 
policemen and military personnel.  In 1993, violence expanded to include 
government officials…” and later civilians.  Not only did the targets of violence 
change, but the “methods and instruments of violence also changed over the 
course of time.”51 
The literature for this thesis utilized a variety of nuances in defining what 
each specific author perceived political violence to be.  As a result, there may be 
some discrepancies as some scholars separate some forms of political violence, 
i.e. kidnappings, riots, etc, from terrorism while others consider the two to be 
equivalent.  The data on political violence analyzed for this thesis was gathered 
from the Global Terrorism Database, which is maintained by the Studies of 
Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) at the University of Maryland.  
In order for an incident to be considered an occurrence of political violence it 
must meet the following criteria: 
1) The act must be aimed at attaining a political, economic, 
religious, or social goal. 2) There must be evidence of an intention 
to coerce, intimidate, or convey some other message to a larger 
audience (or audiences) than the immediate victims. and 3) The 
action must be outside the context of legitimate warfare activities, 
i.e. the act must be outside the parameters permitted by 
                                            
49 Nicholas Sambanis, "Poverty and the Organization of Political Violence," Brookings Trade 
Forum, (2004): 169–170. 
50 Ibid., 172 
51 Mohammed M. Hafez, "Armed Islamist Movements and Political Violence in Algeria," The 
Middle East Journal, 54, no. 4 (Autumn 2000): 584. 
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international humanitarian law (particularly the admonition against 
deliberately targeting civilians or non-combatants).52 
Additionally, both ambiguous and unsuccessful cases were included in the count 
as they demonstrate violent intent, a detail relevant to this study. 
The study of political violence is very dynamic, and may not be as easily 
confined as Gurr initially proposed.  Regardless of how one organizes the types 
of political violence, the overarching theme is the use of violence in politically 
charged circumstances. Political violence includes more than terrorist tactics and 
refers to a state of instability and violent action whether directed at the people or 
the state.  The goal of such violence is to either express dissatisfaction with the 
status quo, or to exert and demonstrate one’s power or authority over another.  
Within this thesis, the two terms will be used interchangeably. 
C. RATIONAL CHOICE 
An important component of theories addressing political violence is the 
notion of rational choice.  Rational choice defines political violence as “the result 
of an organization’s decision that it is a politically useful means to oppose a 
government.”53  The actors’ rationale does not have to be correct or 
commendable, but simply assumes political violence is utilized in conjunction 
with a “consistent set of values, beliefs, and images of the environment.  
Terrorism is seen collectively as a logical means to advance desired ends.”54 
Any situation which accepts the death of innocent individuals may be 
reprehensible and presumed irrational, but the important aspect of rational choice 
is that violent actors have calculated the “cost-benefit” of their decisions and 
determined there is no alternative but violent action.  According to their skewed 
perception, the pros of violent conflict outweigh those of peaceful compliance.55  
                                            
52 National Consortium for START, (2011), http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/using-gtd/, 
(Accessed September 9, 2010). 
53 Martha Crenshaw, "The Causes of Terrorism," Comparative Politics, (1981): 385. 
54 Ibid., 385. 
55 Gurr, Why Men Rebel, 24; Martha Crenshaw, "The Causes of Terrorism," 396. 
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When faced with a repressive government and little opportunity for mobilization, 
rational choice proponents argue that violence is a rational decision because it is 
a “relatively inexpensive and simple alternative, and because its potential reward 
is high.”56  There simply is not another available option to using violence.57 
Critics of the rational choice assumption are skeptical that violent action 
results from calculated cost-benefit analysis.  The opportunity costs of engaging 
in violent rebellion rarely outweigh those of living the status quo.  The 
downtrodden are no match for the larger, stronger and better-trained government 
and military forces.  The impoverished should instead “pursue private aims, like 
staying alive, or avoiding torture, imprisonment and starvation.”58  The average 
individual is not likely to benefit from involvement in a violent rebellion, and thus 
the rational choice would be to remain on the sidelines and continue living their 
lives without dissent.59 
The opposite is true in countries where rebellions have been successful at 
overthrowing governments.  Instead of viewing the government as an 
insurmountable adversary, the oppressed have proof that violent action works 
and so the opportunity cost of engaging in violent rebellion is considerably lower.  
When the public observes how violent tactics earn political power, there is little 
motivation to pursue nonviolent means.60 
D. THEORIES OF POLITICAL VIOLENCE 
The origins of political violence are highly scrutinized and debated.  This 
thesis distinguishes itself in that it is focusing on two nations with similar 
demographics but with a significant disparity in levels of violence.  The major 
existing arguments regarding political violence rely on specific and isolated 
                                            
56 Martha Crenshaw, “The Causes of Terrorism”, 387. 
57 Ibid., 396. 
58 Erich Weede, "On Political Violence and its Avoidance," Acta Politics 39 (2004): 159. 
59 Ibid., 161. 
60 Ibid., 159. 
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indicators of violent mobilization.  These theories will be scrutinized in order to 
establish a framework within which to examine the cases of Morocco and Algeria.  
Understanding the indicators and factors of political violence is imperative to 
future regional security.61 
1. Poverty Breeds Terrorism 
A major misconception persists in the study of political violence.  Many 
continue to believe that poverty breeds terrorism and instability, regardless of 
evidence to the contrary.  Perhaps the larger problem is that this belief is not just 
held by the casual observer inundated with sensationalized media, but that it has 
also taken hold of national leaders and those leading international development 
agencies.  As such, it is imperative to address the notion that poor people are 
more likely to violently revolt or engage in terrorist activity. 
The “rooted-in-poverty” hypothesis stems from the belief that 
impoverished countries teeming with poorly educated, unemployed 
masses qualified by a widening gap between the rich and poor 
combined with low literacy rates are fermentation tanks for 
dangerous and violent militants. The low levels of economic and 
social development increase the appeal of political extremism and 
encourage political violence and instability.62 
While the empirical evidence refutes this hypothesis, it continues to be 
popular, even with prominent U.S. military and government officials.  The ideas 
encompassed within this hypothesis will be henceforth dubbed “popular wisdom”.  
It will encompass the beliefs that political violence is a result of poverty, poor 
education and acute unemployment. 
When campaigning for the United States presidency, President Barack 
Obama wrote an article for Foreign Affairs in which he stated, “extremely poor 
societies and weak states provide optimal breeding grounds for disease, 
terrorism, and conflict.”  His position indicated his belief that the United States 
                                            
61 Jeremy Keenan, "Security & Insecurity in North Africa,” 285. 
62 James Piazza, "Rooted in Poverty?: Terrorism, Poor Economic Development, and Social 
Cleavages," Terrorism and Political Violence 18, no. 1 (2006): 160. 
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has a vested interest in restructuring global wealth and bringing these societies 
out of despotism.  He went on to urge U.S. citizens to “invest in building capable, 
democratic states that can establish healthy and educated communities, develop 
markets, and generate wealth. Such states would also have greater institutional 
capacities to fight terrorism…”63 
In 2008, the United States organized USAFRICOM in order to address the 
issues unique and specific to the African continent.  Yet even with a focus on the 
unique challenges of the African continent, both leaders of the newly established 
USAFRICOM continue to use the same rhetoric as countless other news and 
public media pundits.  That is, Generals Ward and Ham have argued in favor of 
economic development and wealth as the solution to the instability and conflict 
problems.  Poverty, they say, “erodes confidence in national institutions and 
governing capacity” and can lead to the security threats that plague American 
interests. 64 
With data from the U.S. Department of State’s Office of the Coordinator for 
Counterterrorism, James Piazza illustrates the disparity between speculation and 
reality.  Over a 15-year period, out of ten nations most afflicted by terrorist 
incidences, “only three…fit the profile of low levels of socioeconomic 
development”.65  However, evidence illustrates a starkly different reality.  
Research indicates that in lesser-developed nations “economic progress is 
actually negatively related to transnational terrorism.”66  It is not the poorer 
countries, but the richer ones that are more prone to transnational terrorism.   
                                            
63 Barack H. Obama, "Renewing American Leadership," Foreign Affairs (July/August 2007) 
64 Carter F. Ham, Statement to the Senate Armed Services Committee, April 7, 2011, 
Available at: http://armed-services.senate.gov/statemnt/2011/04%20April/Ham%2004-07-11.pdf. 
65 James Piazza, "Rooted in Poverty?: Terrorism, Poor Economic Development, and Social 
Cleavages," 161. 
66 S. Brock Blomberg and Gregory D. Hess, "From (No) Butter to Guns? Understanding the 
Economic Role in Transnational Terrorism," in Terrorism, Economic Development and Political 
Openness, by Philip Keefer and Norman Loayza, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008): 
83. 
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Diego Gambetta and Steffen Hertog demonstrated that a disproportionate 
number of violent extremists were highly educated engineers.67 
Piazza finds that “None of the economic indicators are significant 
predictors of either terrorist incidents or casualties.”68  Rather, in direct conflict 
with popular wisdom, Piazza claims “there is no empirical evidence to support the 
crux of the ‘rooted-in-poverty’ thesis…”69  The fallout from such a revelation can 
be expected to be quite significant.  If poverty is the critical failure point, then it 
also provides an easy answer to the problem of political violence, instability and 
terrorism.  Thus, determining that poverty is the crux of political violence means 
that policy makers no longer have “a potential ‘cure’ for the scourge of terrorism 
and a tool in preventing political violence…”70 
Even while former World Bank President, James Wolfensohn has gone on 
record several times touting poverty as the major variable for terrorism and 
violent conflict, John Underwood of the World Bank disagrees and points out that 
most terrorists are not impoverished, but rather are “well-educated and middle 
class.”71  He observes that while the world overall is coming out of poverty, the 
incidences of terrorism are not falling as would be expected.72  
Regardless of the number of news pundits that lament poverty and the 
agencies that suggest donating more aid to cure political instability, this thesis, 
corroborated by empirical evidence, firmly stands against these proposed 
solutions.  The truly impoverished are too busy working to make ends meet to 
engage in violent political action.  The case of Algeria’s relative wealth and high 
violence is just one example that contradicts this hypothesis.  Therefore, there 
                                            
67 Diego Gambetta, and Steffen Hertog, "Why are there so many Engineers among Islamic 
Radicals?" European Journal of Sociology 50, no. 2 (Aug 2009): 201–230. 
68 Piazza, “Terrorism, Poor Economic Development and Social Cleavages,” 170. 
69 Ibid., 170 
70 Ibid., 170 
71 John Underwood, "Poverty and Terrorism," 2004. 
72 Ibid. 
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must be some other motive for terrorism outside of poverty; being poor, in and of 
itself, is not a sufficient motivator for violent conflict. 
2. Relative Deprivation Theory 
Recognizing the pitfalls in attributing political violence to poverty alone, the 
relative deprivation theory emerged as another popular explanation for political 
violence.  Relative deprivation refers to the discrepancy between “expectation 
and aspiration.  If we expect something to happen then we are likely to feel 
discontented if it does not materialize.  If we aspire to something then we may 
feel less discontent if it does not materialize.”73  The theory, made popular by 
Ted Robert Gurr in 1970, suggests that discontent manifested by the failure to 
aspire or receive can lead to political violence.  Gurr’s three-step model illustrates 
how discontent grows into violent action: “first the development of discontent, 
second the politicization of that discontent, and finally its actualization in violent 
action against political objects and actors.”74  Gurr uses relative deprivation 
theory to fuse psychological variables into the study of political violence.75  It is 
less about the absolute resources that are or are not available, but rather the 
perception of the people as to how fair their share is. 
Gurr demonstrates that a necessary aspect of relative deprivation theory 
is the politicized nature of one’s discontent.  When grievances are successfully 
framed within a political context, they evoke stronger reactions than general 
discontent.  Individuals are able to focus in on a source for their discontent and 
are left to conclude that violent mobilization will achieve sufficient political change 
so as to improve their relative station in society.  This theory is relevant because 
it suggests that the notably higher levels of violence in Algeria could be explained 
by a higher expectation if it could be determined that Algerians, significantly more 
so than Moroccans, have an expectation for a specific quality of life.  
                                            
73 Craig Webber, “Revaluating Relative Deprivation Theory,” Theoretical Criminology, (2007): 
99. 
74 Gurr, Why Men Rebel, 13. 
75 Ibid., 23. 
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W.G. Runciman used the concept of relative deprivation to describe how 
an individual compares his own social and economic statuses to how he 
perceives that of a reference group.  The objective is that abject poverty is not an 
indicator of discontent, but rather the relative inequality within a given society.  “If 
groups that are fairly well off tend to compare themselves with even more 
privileged strata, this could explain why they are sometimes more discontented 
than genuinely poor people, as the latter presumably tend to be much more 
modest in their choice of reference group”.76  
Relative deprivation capitalizes on the existence of disparities in classes 
within a nation and theorizes that because of this disparity, social friction will 
result.  Even those who may be relatively well off can feasibly become 
dissatisfied with their station in life when they are comparing themselves to a 
higher class that is extremely wealthy.  This could help explain the situation in 
Algeria assuming the level of perceived inequality is greater than exists in 
Morocco.  Absolute numbers could mean very little if the entire nation is poor, but 
if there are distinct classes, this may fuel the fires of growing discontent. 
Criminologists Webber and Ross acknowledge that relative deprivation 
theory is useful in identifying violent tendencies, but is not a sufficient explanation 
for the rate of violent mobilization.77  Other critics of the theory observe that 
“deprivation theorists should expect mass rebellions to be fairly frequent,”78 and 
this is no surprise when Gurr purports that “widespread discontent provides a 
general impetus to collective violence.”79  If discontent alone were sufficient for 
political violence, we should expect to see large-scale rebellions across the U.S. 
in light of current economic situations, but this is not the case.  Social 
                                            
76 Axel West Pedersen, "Inequality as Relative Deprivation: A Sociological Approach to 
Inequality Measurement." Acta Sociologica 47, no. 1 (March 2004): 39. 
77 Jeffrey Ian Ross, “Structural Causes of Oppositional Political Terrorism: Towards a Causal 
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mobilization theory also argues that grievances alone are not enough to motivate 
violent collective action.80  Fearon and Laitin imply that relative deprivation is too 
preoccupied with economic grievances. 
Nicholas Sambanis argues that relative deprivation does not help explain 
terrorism or civil conflicts.  Instead, relative deprivation theorists “do not present 
systematic evidence to demonstrate that inequality or structural change are 
necessary and sufficient conditions for violence.”81  Sambanis suggests that 
economic inequality could be responsible for “increasing the risk of political 
instability or regime transition”, but the catalyst is actually regime 
repressiveness.82  The combination of the two variables is a “potent…recipe for 
political instability” and presumably inevitable violent action.83   Instead, while a 
relationship between economic inequality and political violence may exist, it is 
more indirect than relative deprivation theorists would suggest.  Muller concludes 
that by itself, income inequality is a weak indicator of political instability.84 
3. Resource Curse Theory 
Does oil preclude democracy?  Are nations with large stores of natural 
resources fated for corrupt governments, greedy consumerism and devastating 
civil conflict?  There are many who think exactly that and developed what is 
known as the “Resource Curse” theory.  The resource curse theory is based on 
the observation that “states with abundant resource wealth perform less than 
their resource-poor counterparts.”85  On the surface, it seems as if this notion 
can explain why Algeria, with its reliance on hydrocarbons is more unstable than 
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its resource-poor neighbor, Morocco, is.  Yet a deeper and more thorough 
understanding of this theory is necessary in determining the extent to which it 
actually explains the cases of Algeria and Morocco. 
Miriam Lowi defines the resource-curse theory as “the idea that natural 
resource wealth…functions as a constraint, rather than an asset, for 
development.”86  She argues that academics developed this theory in order to 
explain how nations that have an abundance of natural resources—specifically 
hydrocarbons or minerals—perform so much poorer than their resource-poor 
neighbors do.87  Yet, what is it about natural resources that breed corruption and 
instability?  Erich Weede speculates, “rich resource endowments reinforce elite 
predatory behavior and thereby make institutional and economic development 
more difficult.”88  Samuel Huntington also supports the idea of a resource curse 
in his assertion that the democratic trend will bypass the Middle East since many 
of these states “depend heavily on oil exports, which enhances the control of the 
state bureaucracy.”89 
While oil in and of itself does not cause conflict, the rents from such 
natural resources “tend to consolidate what is already in place: incumbents 
remain in power and authoritarianism is reinforced.”90  Ross suggests that 
natural resource wealth is linked to authoritarianism by state repression  “Citizens 
in resource-rich states may want democracy as much as citizens elsewhere, but 
resource wealth may allow their governments to spend more on internal security 
and so block the population’s democratic aspirations.”91 
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In his discussion of the “resource curse”, Ross makes mention of how the 
ailment “Dutch Disease” can afflict political stability.  The term Dutch Disease is a 
media-coined phrase relating to economic misfortune.92  The term dates back to 
the late 1950s when the Netherlands discovered natural gas off its shores.  The 
Dutch nation enjoyed massive profits from its discovery, but soon experienced a 
serious backlash as its non-natural gas exports became less competitive on the 
world market due to the growing strength of the Dutch guilder.93  Even when not 
applicable, this situation evokes a fear of primary commodity-driven markets and 
has given weight to the Resource Curse theory.94 
If it is true that mineral or hydrocarbon resources account for increased 
political instability, the implication is that a more diverse economy will foster a 
more peaceful and stable nation.  States in which revenues are secured from the 
global market do not have to be as accountable to their people.  Most states rely 
on taxes to fund state programs but this is not the case in nations with profitable 
natural resources consumed on the foreign market.  As such, the state can 
operate autonomously from its constituents and use rents to essentially buy 
peaceful obedience from the people.95  In addition, states with large stores of 
natural resources are also likely to maintain disproportionally large military 
forces.  Because wealth that is derived from natural resources can instigate civil 
conflict, resource-endowed states often defend their position with larger 
militaries.  Stronger militaries may indicate a government’s willingness to use 
force to quell public discontent and so result in more civil wars.96 
Given that reliance on a single volatile good can increase the likelihood of 
political violence, greater economic diversification could result in less political 
instability.  However, Henry and Springborg observed how “economic 
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liberalization requires a major political change.”97  This observation is critical 
because while economic diversification may indicate lower levels of violence, this 
is not to say that it is sufficient for political change.  Rather political change is 
necessary for economic liberalization, and so simply trying to diversify a national 
economy without addressing the root issue of policy, it is unlikely there will be 
long-lasting change. 
4. Political Process Theory 
The decision to engage in a collective rebellion is not an impulse decision, 
but one that has been influenced by a myriad of variables.  Several theories 
purport to explain the decision to mobilize, but none better than the political 
process theory, which was originally developed in response to the glaring 
deficiencies of alternative explanations.  The Political Process theory 
distinguishes itself from the other theories because it addresses more than 
variance between national economics.  Rather it suggests that the degree of 
political inclusion and nature of state repression are better indicators of political 
violence.  This theory implies that because Morocco authorizes more political 
inclusion and is more discriminate in its oppression; its citizens have a lower 
inclination towards political discontentment that would lead to violent 
mobilization.  In contrast, this theory would also suggest that because Algeria’s 
government is more closed off, its citizens are more likely to act out in a violent 
manner.  The “repressiveness of the political system or regime” is the prime 
indicator of political violence.98 
As seeds of discontent evolve into violent mobilization that discontent 
must be politicized in order to effectively mobilize violent behavior.  Without 
feelings of frustration or dissatisfaction with the status quo, it is unlikely that 
dissident groups would form and mobilize in collective action.99  The “movement 
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behavior is shaped by the broader political context.”100  It is the character of a 
nation’s political system, which will determine whether populations will mobilize in 
violent rebellions or utilize nonviolent alternatives.101 
Political Process advocates maintain that political violence “is an outcome 
of an ill-fated convergence of three variables—indiscriminate repression, 
exclusive organizations and anti-system ideologies.”102  It is not that poverty, 
perceived inequality and volatile markets are not potential indicators of political 
violence, they just are not sufficient for violent collective action.  
Luis Martinez questions the causal relationship of the political violence-
economic relationship.  Does political violence beget economic failure or does 
economic failure beget political violence?103  The direction of this relationship is 
of particular importance because while the two may coincide in weak states, 
determining the root problem will dictate which course of action can solve the 
dilemma.  If political violence weakens the economy, addressing the economic 
fallout will only be a superficial band-aid, requiring further corrective action for a 
full recovery.  Nicholas Sambanis notes that while economic factors should not 
be negated, collective violence “should be responsive to improvements in the 
degree of political openness even without parallel improvements in economic 
development.”104  Thus, nations with low measures of political freedom are 
presumed to have higher rates of terrorist activity, regardless of their economic 
welfare. 
When the state is oppressive, rebellions ensue and the state often uses 
violent methods to quell the rebellion.  The government’s harsh response is then 
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met with terrorist retaliation.105  Unfortunately, the cycle is difficult to break, as 
one side must choose to respond to violence in a calm and nonviolent manner.  
Fathali Moghaddam explains that many terrorists believe they are acting as a 
proxy government because the official government is too corrupt, unwilling or 
unable to complete the job for which they are appointed.106 
In the article, “The Economics of Violence”, good governance was found 
to be an essential variable in the rates of violence within a country.  This does not 
discount the effect of poverty, income inequality and other economic measures, 
but reinforces the idea that a legitimate political system is just as important as a 
strong economy.107  Just as poor governance can manifest itself into a variety of 
problems; it is also caused by a variety of methods.  It is important to understand 
why states fail to provide good governance in order to understand the negative 
impact of failed policies.  
Those who subscribe to the political process theory do so because they 
believe that while economics can be an indication of weak governance, and is 
often correlated with political violence; poverty and income inequality are not 
sufficient causes of political violence.  The U.S. Agency for International 
Development (USAID) published a study in which they found that “at the macro-
level, wealth does not inoculate against (violent extremism), and better economic 
conditions do not necessarily reduce public endorsement of terrorist tactics.”108  
While donating economic aid is fairly easy, job creation and policy reform are not. 
This is fundamental as to why things are not changing.  Standard economic aid is 
a western approach that lacks the empathy required to address the unique 
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problems of individual countries and therefore lacks positive and meaningful 
results as well. 
There are still those who firmly disagree with the tenets of the political 
process approach. Fearon and Laitin argue that poverty and inequality are better 
indicators of political violence because weak states are the cause of political 
violence and economic variables are simply indicators of weak governance.109  It 
is expected that in nations with weaker governments and corrupt practices, 
rebellions and insurgencies would be that much higher than in nations with 
comparatively stronger governments.110  A significant predicament exists with 
fully open governments in the Middle East and North Africa.  It is a Catch-22, as 
the regimes do not want an open state to be taken over by extreme Islamists only 
to have future progress for democratization be lost, however, it is impossible to 
have a completely open state without allowing all actors to participate.111 
E. CONCLUSION 
Having an understanding of the prominent theories on political violence 
establishes a baseline from which to build upon in the upcoming chapters of this 
thesis.  The following chapters will examine the various variables specific to 
Algeria and Morocco within the framework of the aforementioned theories.  The 
goal is to identify the best explanation for why Algeria suffers from higher rates of 
political violence in comparison to Morocco’s more stable political environment. 
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III. ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
The field of economics is credited with a wide breadth of successes 
ranging from explaining why teachers cheat to why drug dealers live with their 
mothers to how a name establishes one’s destiny.112  However, at some point 
these “causal” relationships overstep their boundaries.  If higher income per 
capita indicates lower levels of terrorism, should it be assumed that richer nations 
should hand over money to poorer nations to ensure international security?  
When do we stop to examine the direction of that relationship? 
A. SOCIO-ECONOMIC STANDARDS 
The popular understanding of political violence is that it stems from 
economic poverty, a lack of education and chronic unemployment.  Therefore, 
these are key areas within which to compare the two case studies.  What 
emerges is a starkly different picture than what popular wisdom implies. 
Literacy is a common measure of education and can reflect a nation’s skill 
level; the amount of importance granted to education and may indicate a 
population’s tendency towards collective violence.  Those who are uneducated 
may be more susceptible to the extremist message, leaving them brainwashed 
and angry with the ruling regime.  Morocco’s people trail the rest of the world in 
social development indicators.  Data from the period 2004–2008 indicate that 
nearly half of adults (15 years and older) are considered illiterate (approximately 
44%).  Youth (15-24 years of age) literacy rates are at 85%, giving hope to the 
idea that Morocco’s situation is improving and that the majority of the illiterate in 
Morocco are older generations.  However, the gender divide is still a very real 
concern as young women trail behind their male counterparts by nearly 20%.113 
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Algeria’s literacy rates are significantly higher than Morocco’s.  The 
literacy rate among adults aged 15 and older is 73% and is almost 94% amongst 
young Algerian males (ages 15–24).  Young women still trail their male 
counterparts, but only by five percentage points in comparison to the nearly 20 
point differential between Morocco’s young men and women.114  Despite the 
higher literacy rates, and presumable education and skill levels, Algeria still 
suffers from more political violence.  
Unemployment is a common concern across North Africa, afflicting 
Morocco and Algeria, both.  Morocco’s unemployment statistics are estimated to 
be around 10%, but this number masks a more serious problem of persistent 
underemployment and youth unemployment.115  Estimates put youth 
unemployment in the urban areas around 26%; meanwhile, job opportunities for 
college graduates are diminishing.116  Like Morocco, Algeria suffers from high 
unemployment.  While its unemployment rates are gradually improving, recent 
data suggest total unemployment still hovers around 14%.  Even more troubling 
is that fact the youth unemployment rates range between 15–20%. 
Underemployment and high rates of youth unemployment are devastating 
to political stability because youth who are looking forward and see the bloated 
labor market have little incentive to work hard for an education.  College-
educated individuals may be working monotonous positions created by the state 
to simply employ the citizens.  There is little job satisfaction, incentive to work 
harder or suggestion for a better life.  Instead, those who were underemployed, 
or completely unemployed, are left to lay blame for their position and the lack of 
better paying and more rewarding jobs in their country.  Such lamenting could be 
a precursor to violent collective action. 
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1. Poverty 
Poverty is sometimes thought to increase the rate of political violence 
because poor people have nothing left to lose.  They are living in subpar 
conditions, often without sufficient nutrition and presumably want to lash out in 
anger.  However, some scholars assert that poverty is not in and of itself a cause 
of political violence, but rather it measures a nation’s ability to govern.117  Fearon 
and Laitin justify poverty as a key indicator of ethnic conflict because they argue 
that poverty is an effective measure of weak governance.  Weak states and 
judicial systems are not equipped to quell violence, and that in such cases, the 
people view violent action as their only recourse against a failing state.118  It is 
the weak state that increases violent behavior, not simply the absence of 
personal wealth. 
Morocco’s economic situation, as illustrated in Figure 1, is not enviable.  
The national GDP per capita in 2009 was $2,811 and roughly 3% of the 
population was earning less than $2 per day.119 The most recent data for Algeria 
indicates that 6.5% of the population (nearly twice that of Morocco) earns less 
than $2 dollars per day.120    However, Morocco continues to be a model of a 
poor nation that still enjoys relative peace and stability to its MENA neighbors.  In 
comparison, Algeria’s GDP per capita was $4,029 in 2009, a figure almost 50% 
higher than Morocco’s GDP per capita but still experiences high rates of political 
violence.121 
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Figure 1.   Comparison of Morocco and Algeria’s GDP per capita (From World 
Bank, 2011) 
Assuming poverty could explain all counts of political violence, Morocco 
should have much higher rates of political violence and terrorism.  However, 
Algeria’s population earns almost 50% more per year than Morocco’s population, 
and still Algeria undoubtedly suffers from more frequent and violent political 
instability. Poverty is simply a poor explanation for political violence in the cases 
of Morocco and Algeria.  Some may advocate that wars are fought in order to 
“win wealth and leave poverty” but the analysis of Morocco and Algeria 
unequivocally refutes this idea.122 
2. Economic Diversification 
The resource curse theory would argue that Algeria’s political violence is a 
result of its reliance on hydrocarbons.  Morocco, on the other hand, has minimal 
hydrocarbon stores, instead basing its economy on agriculture and services in 
addition to phosphate exports.  The question still stands as to whether a heavier 
reliance on one volatile good results in greater political instability and violent 
militancy. 
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It is possible that political stability is linked to a nation’s economic 
structure.  Some contend that greater economic diversification contributes to a 
more stable nation because there is more interaction and accountability between 
the government and its people.  With the economy divided between public and 
private ventures, as well as among different industries, the people are more 
invested in their economic welfare.  They are as much responsible for economic 
success as the government. 
On the other hand, an economy founded on a single natural resource 
creates an entirely different political environment.  Natural resources like oil and 
natural gas are most profitable when traded on the international market.  
However, this is where they are most volatile as well.  In states like Algeria, 
where the resources are owned, processed, and sold by the state, there is little 
involvement from the people.  They instead rely on the state to disseminate 
income and provide social services.  In times of plenty, the people are content to 
sit idly by, but when market prices fall, the people are hit hardest. Oil and gas 
revenues account for more than 80% of Algeria’s national income, a detail that 
could contribute to its higher levels of political violence.  Without economic 
diversification, there is little motive for the incumbents to answer to the people. 
Countries with privatized sectors help keep the government accountable.  
With independent banking systems, the Moroccan economy is also much more 
privatized than Algeria’s state owned banking systems.123  However, simply 
refining a nation’s economic system is not an isolated endeavor.  This is where 
the resource curse theory begins to fall apart.  The government must revise its 
policies, thus complicating the policy-economy relationship.  Morocco may 
provide an example of economic diversification coinciding with political stability 
and peaceful state-constituent relationships, but it does not prove that economic 
diversification is necessary or sufficient for said benefits. 
                                            
123 Henry and Springborg, Globalization and the Politics of Development in the Middle East. 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001): 88.  
 38 
Algeria went through several periods of leaders who made attempts to 
liberalize the economy, but these were generally superficial displays with no real 
change. In the last five to ten years, Algeria has been making more aggressive 
moves as if it is liberalizing its economy.124  From Boumedienne to Chadli to 
Bouteflika, Algeria’s leaders’ attempts to privatize national businesses have 
accomplished little more than opening the economy up to manipulation rather 
than greater efficiency.125  The economic power is still consolidated into the 
hands of a few and the people of Algeria are left at the whims of importers and 
state officials.126 
It is not the natural resource that causes political instability, but rather the 
resource that can create a barrier between the state and the people.  Stronger 
governance can override the influence of volatile markets, and it may be that 
reliance on natural resource wealth is an indicator of weaker governance.  
Instead, it would seem this is a much larger issue with regards to the drivers of 
political violence than simply an economy reliant on one natural resource.  
Economic diversification is not enough to explain the disparity between Algeria 
and Morocco.  The real problem may be that poor economics do not cause 
violence, but that violence impedes poor economic development.127 
3. Income Inequality 
In an attempt to compensate for the failures in the ability for poverty, as 
measured by income per capita, to sufficiently account for political violence, 
some researchers suggested that income inequality could be a better indicator.  
According to these scholars, nations with a significantly unequal distribution of 
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income would see a corresponding increase in violent collective action.  This led 
to the development of the relative deprivation theory. 
GDP per capita alone cannot distinguish levels of inequality in a given 
population as it averages all income across the population. Two nations with 
similar GDP per capita can be wildly different in the equality of their populations 
based on how much the earnings of the highest 20% compare with those of the 
lowest 20%.  There are several ways of measuring this poverty gap, one of which 
is the Gini income coefficient, or the Gini index. 
The Gini index is most often used to measure the relative level of 
inequality and so indicate the projected level of instability in that given data set.  
The index has also come to be known as the “index of envy”.128  When 
interpreting the Gini coefficient, a number closer to zero indicates equality and a 
number closer to one suggests inequality.  For example, “one person has all the 
income or consumption; all others have none.”129  The Gini index is similar, but 
measures from 0 to 100, with 0 representing complete equality and 100 
representing complete inequality.  A society without a middle class and the rest 
of the population divided between very rich and very poor would represent “a 
maximum degree of relative deprivation.”130  It is this kind of scenario that 
Runciman would argue most closely aligns to the relative deprivation theory, 
which states that social grievances lead to conflict.  
In the cases of Algeria and Morocco, the Gini index is not very useful.  The 
most recent data for Algeria is from 1995 and the calculated Gini was 35.3.131  
The Gini index for Morocco in 1995 was 39 and rose slightly to 40.9 in 2007.132  
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Thus, the Gini index suggests that Morocco suffers from greater income 
inequality relative to Algeria. A very telling detail is that the most recent data for 
Algeria’s economic indicators is nearly 16 years old. This could demonstrate two 
different scenarios, either a closed government hesitant to reveal its questionable 
economic state, or a weak government incapable of collecting accurate statistics.  
Neither of these scenarios is desirable and could create an environment of 
distrust, cynicism and fear.  If the public is already prone to violence, a closed or 
weak government could provide the necessary catalyst for repeated violent 
mobilization. 
If the theory of relative deprivation stands correct, then redistributing the 
income in Algeria would result in achieving greater political stability, similar to 
that in Morocco.133  However, data shows that the richest 10% in Morocco 
receive nearly one-third of national income while the top 10% in Algeria receive 
about one-quarter of the national income. In addition, Algeria’s top 20% hold 
nearly half of the national income.134  Further research needs to be done to 
determine whether or not relative deprivation theory can explain the discrepancy 
in political stability between Algeria and Morocco. 
There are inherent flaws with the Gini index.  These flaws lend support to 
the idea that a direct measure of income disparity may be more useful in 
comparing the cases of Morocco and Algeria.  One of the most glaring 
disadvantages of the Gini index is that it “var(ies) when the distribution varies, no 
matter if the change occurs at the top, the bottom, or the middle (any transfer of 
income between two individuals has an effect on the indexes, irrespective of 
whether it takes place among the rich, among the poor, or between the rich and 
the poor).”135 
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It is important to understand that while many economic indicators appear 
to influence the existence of political violence, the reality is much more complex. 
Economics may play a role in the level and degree of political violence within a 
given nation, but they do not fully explain the cases of Morocco and Algeria. 
Instead, there are other variables at play.  Rather than focus on increasing 
wages or GDP, or decreasing unemployment, other research suggests greater 
economic openness is critical to economic freedom and is better equipped to 
increase growth rates.136 Economic openness often correlates with political 
openness, a factor, which may prove to be a more reliable indicator of violent 
action in Morocco and Algeria. 
4. Global Relations 
Morocco has a strong relationship with the United States, arguably one of 
the best in MENA.  On the contrary, Algeria has worked to establish and maintain 
boundaries between itself and other Western nations.  Understandably, Algeria’s 
history with colonialism has tarnished its perspective of Western diplomacy.  
Algerians suspect an ulterior motive and are quick to preserve their autonomy, 
even to a fault.  Morocco distinguishes itself by working to maintain favorable 
trade and diplomatic relations. 
Economic factors are likely the primary motivation to normalize relations 
with some of the more historically radical countries in the region, but the 
discovery and development of natural gas industries in Algeria and oil fields in 
Libya also serves as motivation for U.S. involvement.137  Algeria’s discovery of 
hydrocarbon stores has made an enormous difference both economically and 
diplomatically.  Unfortunately, oil is a volatile international commodity and 
Algeria’s economic dependence on the resource led to roller coaster economic 
conditions.  Algeria has also made recent oil discoveries with estimated oil 
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reserves valued at over twelve billion barrels.138  This has prompted the 
significant trading relations between Algeria and the U.S., making the United 
States “Algeria’s biggest trading partner and largest source of foreign 
investment.”139 
Algeria is an active member of the Organization for Petroleum Exporting 
Countries (OPEC); but is still only an observer of the World Trade Organization 
(WTO).  Its membership in transnational organizations appears to be mainly 
limited to those with an anti-Western bias.  This is demonstrative of a nation with 
a firm distrust of Western nations.  Algeria continues to hone an identity 
independent of Western influence, even in the realm of economics.  It is possible 
that this distrust contributes to a national identity skeptical of foreign influences 
and ulterior motives.  Violent mobilization is more likely when an identity of 
distrust and skepticism exists. 
Morocco was among the first nations to recognize the Unites States as an 
independent nation in 1787, and maintains the longest standing diplomatic 
contract in US history.140  The two nations share a long relationship based on 
mutual respect.  While Morocco has opposed some U.S. anti-terror initiatives, the 
small North African country has also been recognized for its contribution to anti-
terrorism efforts.  Morocco enjoys a bilateral free-trade agreement with the U.S. 
and has been appointed as a major non-NATO ally.  In addition, Morocco 
continues to receive millions of dollars in aid each year from the USAID.141  
However, despite the favorable relationship between the governments of 
Morocco and the United States, a clear divide still exists between the state and 
the people with regard to pro-Western endeavors.142 
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Morocco benefits from a favorable trade relationship with the European 
Union (EU), but this is not without setbacks.  Morocco attempted to join the EU in 
1987 but was promptly rejected.143  Still, nearly twelve years later, Morocco and 
the EU entered into free-trade for industrial goods and Morocco hopes to have a 
comprehensive free-trade agreement with the EU by 2012.144  Morocco was also 
appointed a beneficiary of the European Neighborhood Agreement (ENA) in 
2006.145  The ENA grants special privileges to specified nations that are not a 
part of the European Union.  As a result, the EU has bestowed more than 
US$1.4 billion onto Morocco from 1995–2003, making it the “top beneficiary 
among Mediterranean nations of community assistance from the European 
Union.”146 
Morocco is working hard to increase its tourism sector with the king 
making the expansion one of his primary goals.  One of the king’s milestones 
was to increase the number of international visitors to 10 million, up from 2.2 
million in 2003.  As of 2008, Morocco hosted 7.8 million foreign tourists.147   
Tourism is an interesting economic sector because the country’s prosperity 
depends on stability.  The people have a vested interest in preserving the 
security and safety of the nation.  However, how much of this relationship is 
dependent on tourism and not tourism being a derivative of a peaceful nation? 
B. CONCLUSION 
Economics can highlight deficiencies within a country that may favor 
violent action.   
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However, economic measures of poverty, income inequality, and globalization 
fail to fully account for why Algeria’s population is significantly more prone to 
political violence as opposed to Morocco.  The two may be correlated, but the 
cause and effect relationship just is not substantiated. 
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IV. POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT 
Economic development may encourage a more peaceful environment, but 
economics alone does not prompt collective violent action.  Economic 
deprivation, while lamentable and likely to foster envy, is not a sufficient 
explanation for the vast difference in violent action between Algeria and Morocco.  
In an effort to find a more substantial explanation, many political scientists 
understandably, look to the nature of political development.  The nature of 
political Islam, Government structures, electoral processes, political parties and 
accessibility to national leadership are possible explanatory factors for the 
frequency and degree of political violence in Algeria as opposed to the relative 
stability of Morocco. 
In trying to determine the reason Morocco enjoys greater political stability 
in comparison to Algeria, the political process theory offers an explanation.  
Nations with greater degrees of political freedom will also enjoy greater stability 
and lower incidences of political violence.  The political process model goes back 
to McAdam’s assumption that discontent “is relevant as a necessary condition for 
the formation of dissident groups.”148 
A. POLITICAL VIOLENCE AND STABILITY 
Figure 2 illustrates how Algeria’s cases of political violence vastly 
outnumber Morocco’s cases.  This data demonstrates a glaring disparity in 
violence levels between Morocco and Algeria, but it does not provide the 
justification, rationale or fundamental drivers of political violence. 
                                            
148 Muller, “Income Inequality, Regime Repressiveness and Political Violence”, 48. 
 46 
 
Figure 2.   Political Violence in Algeria and Morocco (After SMART, 2011) 
The Western Sahara continues to plague Morocco’s southern border since 
its independence from Spain in 1976.  When the Spanish pulled out, the territory 
known as Western Sahara became a pawn between Mauritania and Morocco.  
Mauritania has since pulled out and the United Nations (UN) established the 
United Nations Mission for Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) to 
maintain a presence in the region.  However, the UN presence has accomplished 
little considering as recently as June 6, 2011 MINURSO has failed in mediating 
conflict resolutions.149  While those within the territory request the opportunity for 
self-rule, Morocco still considers Western Sahara to be a Moroccan protectorate.  
To further complicate problems, Algeria continues to defend the right of the 
Popular Front for the Liberation of Saqiat al-Hamra and Rio de Oro (POLISARIO) 
to independence.  This is likely a reflection of Algeria’s own deep-seated values 
of self-rule in light of their bloody war for independence with the French.150  This 
position continues to be a source of friction between Morocco and Algeria.  Yet 
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despite this continued source of violent tensions, the Moroccan government has 
effectively framed the Western Sahara as an external entity and has used it to 
unify the Moroccan people against an external force. 
Within a region renowned for its violence and instability, Morocco enjoys 
relative peace and stability, though it is occasionally subjected to sporadic violent 
attacks.  The Global Terror Database only lists twenty-three separate incidences 
from 1973 to 2008.  These cases of violence are in the wake of a fierce but short 
revolution, culminating in a national victory over French colonials.  In the years 
since its revolution, Morocco has not struggled with political violence as Algeria 
has.  The vast majority of the violent cases in Morocco are the product of 
transnational terrorist groups.  Because the political violence in Morocco is rarely 
linked to domestic uprisings, as is the case in Algeria, it is possible that conflicts 
with external forces actually unifies a nation, strengthens its identity and supports 
the government. 
Algeria’s long and violent struggle for independence contributes to its high 
rates of political violence.  The indiscriminate use of violence, the disregard for 
collateral civilian deaths and the frequency of violent action has arguably shaped 
the Algerian perspective on political violence.   
The National Liberation Front (FLN) organized as the primary leader to 
help Algeria reclaim its territory and sovereignty.  In their pursuit of independence 
from the French, the FLN used violent methods of revolt and were responsible for 
numerous bombings in the French sectors of Algeria.  The nearly 125 years of 
French colonization had effectively destroyed any previous notion of Algerian 
identity, leaving the new opposition to define an identity of their choosing.  The 
group used Islam to unify the people against the French and define a new 
national identity.151 
On November 1, 1954, the FLN initiated the Algerian War for 
Independence by calling their fellow Algerians to rise up against the French and 
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reclaim their nation.152  The FLN and the French engaged in an eight-year 
struggle for power, incurring the deaths of more than 200,000 Algerian 
citizens.153  In 1962, the French finally gave in and signed a cease-fire granting 
official independence to Algeria on July 5, 1962.154  Shortly thereafter Algeria 
held the first formal elections in her history.155 
With the rise of Islamism in the late 1970s and through the 1980s, 
Algeria’s Islamist movements mobilized into a broad organization known as the 
Front of Islamic Salvation (FIS).  They continued to spread the message of a 
unified Islamic state and introduced the idea of Islamism in politics.156  While the 
movement did not initially promote violence, the original message quickly 
crumbled as the FIS made its moves for political inclusion.157 
At the turn of the decade, Algeria began experimenting with open 
democratic elections. The FIS entered the election process with two starkly 
different public messages.  The FIS’s primary leader, Abassi Madani, claimed to 
respect the democratic process and professed a willingness to participate and 
abide by it.  He also asserted that Islam and democracy were not conflicting in 
nature.158  However, his right-hand man Ali Belhaj professed a different 
message.  Belhaj refuted the idea that Islamism and democracy could coexist 
and instead declared, “Any victory for Islamists through polls would be ‘not a 
victory for democracy but a victory for Islam.’”159 
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The FIS was hugely successful during the first round of the elections, 
taking 188 of 430 seats in the national assembly.160  At that point, when it 
appeared as if the FIS would also win with a landslide vote, Algeria’s military 
cancelled the second round of elections.  Algeria, along with the rest of the world, 
was afraid of the implications associated with Islamists being voted into power.  
After the cancellations of the elections, the Algerian government moved for the 
dissolution of the party and “unleashed a campaign of repression”.161 
Algeria’s problems intensified after the FIS lost the elections.  The nation 
was so fearful of what would happen if the Islamists took over, they removed any 
potential for democracy.  This also removed little chance of democracy for 
anyone else in the region.  Instead, the Middle East began using Algeria as a 
rallying call against democracy. Even the rest of the world used Algeria as 
justification for why democracy could never succeed in the Islamic world.  Thus 
began a long period in the Middle East of a fear of democracy.  The term “one 
and done” referred to the idea that if Islamists were allowed to participate in 
elections, there would never be any more elections in the future and became the 
mantra for those pessimistic about the potential for democracy in the Middle 
East. 
The added pressure of Algeria’s negative experience with Islamist 
elections has only served to further justify Morocco’s opposition to full political 
acquiescence to Islamist demands.  Nearly ten years of bloodshed ensued after 
Algeria canceled its 1992 elections rather than let the Islamists win the vote.162  
The Moroccan monarch has since used the incident to justify limiting electoral 
opportunities to Islamist parties in Morocco. 
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B. POLITICAL ISLAM / ISLAMISM 
Islamism is an indispensable facet of politics in Morocco and Algeria.  As 
much as Christianity informs the GOP dialectic in the United States, Islam 
continues to influence policy in the two case studies.  It is a cornerstone of each 
nation’s identity and shapes each nation’s respective development as a whole.  
However, the attitude of the government and the circumstances surrounding the 
expansion of Islamism in each country has, in kind, directed the course of 
political opposition in that country.  Political Islam promotes the application of 
Islamic principles to political practice and Islamists are those Muslims that want 
more from Islam than religion; they want political activism.163  Islamists “are 
united in their conviction that the most vexing problems facing contemporary 
Muslim societies can be resolved through an individual and collective return to 
religion.”164 
Islamism emerged during Algeria’s War for Independence.  The political 
theology denoted a significant distinction between the French culture and the 
indigenous rebellion.165  It also continued to shape Algerian national identity 
towards a more Islamic-oriented nation as opposed to the secular French 
colonial overtones to which the people had been subjected.  The rise of Islamism 
was predominantly peaceful and not yet known for the protests and rebellions 
that would eventually tarnish the Islamist reputation.166  Islamism continued to 
grow in popularity in Algeria and the rest of the Middle East in the late 1970s and 
into the 1980s. 
By 1988, Algerian Islamist organizations turned more aggressive and 
violent in their methods against the state and eventually led to Chadli’s decision 
to pursue political liberalization.  The people of Algeria wanted a change to the 
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existing military rule that oppressed the average citizen.  However, despite the 
fact that the Islamists were given the opportunity to participate in the Algerian 
elections, the majority proclaimed pluralism and democracy were a “French 
concept designed to sow hatred and division amongst Muslims”.167  By framing 
democracy as a colonial invention, the Islamist message resonated with 
Algerians who resented the government for ignoring the poverty of its people.168 
While some doubt the capacity of the FIS to hijack democracy in order to 
take power and institute an Islamic state, the fear of such a scenario pervaded 
Algerian society.169  Considering the conflicting messages broadcasted by the 
two FIS leaders, the FIS was unable to convince skeptics that they would respect 
the democratic process.170  In the wake of the Islamist participation in the 
Algerian elections that fed into a brutal civil war, most Arab nations fear the 
political backlash and potential violent rebellions believed to be associated with 
Islamism. 
More than how religion is integrated into policy, there are two other 
political characteristics that matter when it comes to defusing potential conflicts.  
They are “1) a pluralized political space and 2) iterative free elections.”171  
Algeria’s free elections were too sudden and granted too much access to state 
authority before the people were ready.  In addition, Algeria’s Islamists had 
combined into one large organization without a clear message, evidenced by the 
conflicting rhetoric of its two primary leaders.  Had there been a more gradual 
transition, as we see in Morocco, with the opportunity for multiple parties, 
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religious and secular, to form and respond to the will of the people, it is likely the 
Algerian Civil War would not have played out as it did.  
It is often assumed that political Islam is a standardized political 
philosophy with no variance.  However, it is also possible that “expanded political 
liberty…can facilitate the emergence of multiple versions of political Islam…”172   
Morocco’s experience with Islamism tends to support the latter idea.  Within 
Morocco, there are several Islamic organizations and political parties that 
demonstrate a wide range of adherence to Islamic values.  It is possible that the 
existence of multiple strong Islamist proponents assists in the moderation of 
these groups, as they must compete with each other in order to gain popular 
support. 
The most prominent party in Moroccan politics is the Party for Justice and 
Development (PJD), a group committed to maintaining genuine political 
participation and legitimate democratic institutions.173  The PJD has been an 
active participant but they claim that they are more of a political party with an 
Islamist background.  Their goal is not to dominate politics with their religion, but 
to be true to their faith at the same time. 
The PJD was not a privileged organization and did not enjoy an easy 
transition into national politics.  Instead, the organization has suffered setbacks in 
its pursuit of greater participation in Moroccan politics.  The PJD became the first 
Islamist party to participate in Morocco’s open elections in 1997, however they 
enjoyed only limited success.174  The party succeeded in securing less than 3% 
of parliamentary seats; however, it set the stage for moderate Islamist parties to 
                                            
172 McFaul and Wittes, "The Limits of Limited Reforms," 31. 
173 Marina Ottaway and Meredith Riley, Morocco: From Top Down Reform to Democratic 
Transition? Carnegie Papers (Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 
2006):15. 
174 Ibid., 13–14. 
 53 
participate in electoral politics.175  The PJD made further inroads in the 2007 
elections and continues to gain support and momentum, but remains an 
uncertain player in future Moroccan politics.176  This moderate version of political 
Islam may be in response to the extremist violence witnessed in Algeria, but it 
may also be due to unique factors embedded in Morocco’s political and social 
make-up.  
Morocco has attempted to offer political access to moderate Islamist 
parties and has witnessed a rise in Islamist political parties.177  The Islamists 
constitute a significant representation of Morocco’s major political players and 
they continue to become stronger and slowly gain more power.178  Morocco 
allows different parties to participate, including Islamist-associated parties. 
Despite the façade of political participation, Morocco’s monarchy still limits the 
actual power wielded by the political actors outside of those appointed by the 
state.179 
While it is contrary to most contemporary news pundits, the inclusion of 
Islamism into national identity may actually serve to decrease the occurrence of 
violence.  Islamism is likely not the root of violence and instead lends credibility 
to the notion that greater political access is a better indicator of political stability.  
The people are provided the opportunity to share their voices. “With few open 
channels for political recourse, the result is societal frustration and a sense of 
alienation.  The feeling of political impotence is exacerbated in the face of 
security service repression and administrative processes that attempt to 
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depoliticize civil society and prevent oppositional activities.”180  Regardless of a 
political party’s religious affiliation, a more open political system will earn the trust 
and compliance of its people. 
C. GOVERNMENTS 
Morocco and Algeria present two sides of the spectrum in discussing 
political openness.  While Morocco has had periods of government oppression, 
Algeria’s government has been much more aggressive in defending its power 
and stalling political liberalization.  Morocco’s monarchy has maintained strong 
control over the nation in a manner that has never existed in Algeria.  It is also 
possible that because the monarchy outlasted both the Ottoman Empire and the 
French colonization, it has greater perceived legitimacy than Algeria’s takeover 
governments.  Algeria’s people instead had to endure repeated violent takeovers, 
coups, colonization, invasions, etc.  Perhaps Algerians have less faith or identity 
invested in their government and so they resort to violence in order to express 
dissatisfaction and potentially influence regime change.  It is also possible that 
because the Islamist groups in Morocco are relatively weak and fragmented, they 
are unlikely to “mount an effective challenge to the state as in Algeria.”181  
However, the FIS proved to be a formidable opposition because it successfully 
amassed several Islamist groups into one political opposition group. 
Muller points out that regime repressiveness is a “key indicator of the 
structure of political opportunities available to dissident groups.”  Closed regimes 
provide little opportunity for rebels to mobilize and open regimes typically offer 
peaceful alternatives to violent collective action.182  Algeria responded to a large 
discontented group and in fear, closed the doors to democracy in cancelling its 
1992 elections.  This gave a glimmer of hope to its people before throwing the 
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population back into a society of political oppression and zero representation.  
The people saw what they could have and were now angry that they could not 
have it.  Morocco has taken steps to not go down the same road. 
Morocco’s monarchy has slowly liberalized the economy and political 
system.  This has enabled the Moroccan public to become accustomed to the 
new rules and for parties to develop into truly representative organizations.  
Rather than a few forming a political party and directing the public’s vote, as 
evident in Algeria, Morocco’s opposition groups have had to work to gain the 
trust and following of the Moroccan people.  While there are cases of 
disenfranchised Moroccans frustrated with the political environment, the political 
parties are not given enough leeway to develop their own policies and attempt to 
hijack the democratic process. 
Because Algeria was subject to an overnight liberalization of the electoral 
process, a strong group, already organized and poised to seize control, was 
given unfettered access and the people were left in the wake.  Dissatisfaction 
with the sitting regime was enough to support the Islamist parties and believe in 
their message.  Unfortunately, had a more moderate opposition had time to 
emerge and represent the voices of the moderate, the debacle of the 1992 
elections may not have played out as it did. 
Its monarchs may have been reticent at first, but the slow assimilation of 
democratic procedures in Morocco may be why the nation enjoys greater political 
stability and fewer violent episodes.  In addition, the more consistent bouts of 
violent conflict in Morocco’s history have been with the Western Sahara.  This 
results in a cause that is nationally unifying and serves to strengthen the 
legitimacy of the government.  Instead, in Algeria, the conflicts most often result 
from dissatisfaction with the state’s governance. 
Abadie demonstrated that open regimes are more likely to enjoy peace, 
harsh closed ones allow little opportunity for violent action and that intermediate 
 56 
regimes are most likely to experience high levels of violent political backlash.183  
On the surface Morocco does not fit this mold.  The monarchs have periodically 
reduced political liberties during times when they felt threatened, as well as 
having submitted alleged political enemies to harsh retribution.  The monarchy 
still holds final authority, and is not afraid to exercise it.  However, Morocco is 
also more apt to allow for the political participation of its Islamist groups.  Overall, 
Morocco continues to do better to improve the political freedoms of its people, in 
spite of its poor economic welfare.  As a result, the nation and its people live in a 
nation free of mass insurgency. 
While a large percentage of Moroccans express disinterest in politics and 
claim that the political system is fraudulent, the ability to participate and vocalize 
their discontent may mean Moroccans are less likely to violently revolt.  The 
Moroccan political system instead allows for alternative and nonviolent methods 
of expressing dissatisfaction.  
Algeria has instituted a system of harsh repression.  The Islamist rebellion 
first grew in response to the state’s closed politics and repression of the people.  
When it seemed as if the movement would boil over, Algeria opened the 
floodgates to allow full political participation.  The problem with this policy 
reversal is that it happened so quickly.  One day, the people were faced with zero 
representation or voice and frustrated to the point of violent rebellion.  The next, 
they were offered the opportunity to take office and effect political change.  There 
was no opportunity to adjust or establish alternative political voices.  Rather 
those that were being the most oppressed were the quickest to rally electoral 
support.  There was a sense that the opportunity may not last and so the most 
radical had the loudest voice and most aggressive drive to participate in the first 
elections.  Had there been a more gradual political liberalization, it is possible 
that more moderate voices would have emerged and resonated with a larger 
majority of the Algerian people. “(Islamic rebellion) is often a defensive reaction 
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to an overly repressive regime that misapplies its repression in ways that 
radicalizes, rather than deters, movement activists and supporters.”184 
The application of indiscriminate versus discriminate oppression is also a 
key factor in the emergence of violent mobilization.  States that institute 
indiscriminate violence and repressive tactics against their people are more likely 
to experience a violent backlash than those states that are more discriminate in 
their treatment of their people.  This is because discriminate repression is 
interpreted as more digestible by constituents.  It is as if the victims of 
discriminate violence “deserved” what they got.  However, indiscriminate violence 
breeds hatred and resentment, even among those who were not radicalized to 
begin with.  Indiscriminate violence is perceived as unfair and tends to breed 
dissent more strongly than specifically targeted state oppression. 
D. ELECTIONS 
The struggle for independence and resulting rule has had a unique and 
different impact in how each nation established its elections.  Elections are an 
important component of political institutions and it is interesting that the 
monarchy has freer and fairer elections than the social republic.  Recognized as 
one of the most open societies in the Middle East, Morocco allows political 
opposition parties to exist, though the regime continues to limit their 
participation.185  Morocco’s alleged openness is not equivalent to the openness 
of elections in established Western democracies but this gradual transition to a 
more open democracy may be the critical factor as to why it has not suffered a 
mass insurgency.  It is possible that open elections may increase political stability 
rather than threaten it. 
Unfortunately, Morocco is witnessing a diminishing voter turnout.  
According to RAND researchers, the voter turnout in Morocco has decreased by 
over fifty percentage points in less than forty years (from 85% in 1970 to 37% in 
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2007).186  This decrease reflects poorly on Morocco’s political development.  Low 
voter turnout can indicate voter dissatisfaction and distrust in the political 
process.  Some scholars suggest that Moroccans may have achieved a level of 
political development in which they exercise their freedom to vote by choosing 
not to vote.187  In comparison, the percentage of US citizens that vote in 
presidential elections averages out to 52% in presidential elections since 
1980.188  What we see is that open elections may help internal stability but do 
not necessarily require comprehensive voter turnout.  Instead, an open political 
environment may encourage various forms of political expression outside of 
baking extremist political groups.189 
King Hassan II, and later his son King Mohammed VI, claimed to support 
democratization but was slow-moving in effecting actual political reforms.  From 
independence until the 1990s, Morocco had pretty stagnant political 
development.  Political participation was really only in name, not practice as King 
Hassan kept close reins on political access.  Then King Hassan II “changed tack 
and started a slow process of opening up the political system.”190  Approximately 
two-thirds of Moroccans maintain a dismal outlook on political decision-making in 
their own country.  They are of the mindset that the typical Moroccan has little 
impact on policy change.191 
The FLN helped Algeria achieve independence from the French in 1962, a 
new government took power in 1965 through a bloodless military coup.192  In the 
wake of Houari Boumediene’s death, Chadli Bendjedid assumed Algeria’s 
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Presidency and ruled through the 1980s.193  In response to the rise of Islamism 
and the frequent social protests and riots, Bendjedid established Algeria’s first 
free local elections.194  These elections gave way to the first multipart general 
elections the following year and set the stage for nearly ten years of brutal 
conflict.195  It was these elections that became the example to which people 
pointed when explaining why democracy would never thrive in the Middle East. 
The current President, Abdelaziz Bouteflika, was elected to office in 1999.  
The elections were fraught with fraud and Bouteflika’s legitimacy is questionable.  
His reelections in 2004 and 2009 were won with 83.5% and 90.24% of the vote, 
respectively.196  Most leaders in established Western democracies are elected 
with (50–65%) of the votes and indicates legitimate political opposition and 
campaigning. It is also possible that the state prevents opposition voters from 
participating resulting in disproportionately high voter ratings.  This fear of the 
people indicates an oppressive government and incapacity to respond to the will 
of the people.  Thus, it is likely that Algerians feel marginalized and ignored, thus 
fueling their frustrations and animosity towards the state and its institutions. 
Algeria currently maintains a multi-party system, albeit not as robust or 
open as Morocco’s.  In the 2007 parliamentary elections, three parties emerged 
as the most prominent: the National Liberation Front, the National Rally for 
Democracy, and the Movement for a Peaceful Society.197  In contrast to 
Morocco’s political parties, Algeria prohibits any variant of religious political 
parties.198 
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Although Algerians are turning out to vote in much higher numbers than 
Moroccans, it is possible that Moroccans may be exercising their right not to vote 
while Algeria could be falsifying its numbers.  It may appear as if Moroccans are 
less politically active, but the reality may be that they enjoy and are exercising 
greater political freedom than their Algerian neighbors. 
E. CONCLUSION 
The role of history in shaping a people, combined with the speed of 
transition, plays a critical role in the decision to resort to violence in situations of 
discontent and frustration.  In societies where level-headed reign, it is more likely 
that extremism will be mitigated by a public’s intolerance for violent action. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
While it is true ‘Morocco has never held itself out as a model for 
others and has not undertaken [its] reforms in order to offer anyone 
any lessons,’ the reality is that the country does offer an example of 
how integral transformation voluntarily undertaken and carried out 
both with respect for history, religion, and culture, and at an 
appropriate speed can offer a path to the future that balances the 
competing demands of stability and openness to change.199 
A. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
This thesis addressed the puzzle exhibited by Morocco and Algeria with 
respect to their experience with political violence.  Contrary to popular wisdom, 
Morocco, the much poorer of the two countries, enjoyed greater political stability 
with less incidences of political violence than Algeria.  While prominent leaders 
advocate economic solutions to the threat of political instability, Morocco and 
Algeria present a counterexample.  This thesis sought to answer what, if not 
poverty, was responsible for the disparity between the two countries. 
The first hypothesis suggested that increased economic diversification 
would lead to lower levels of political violence.  This hypothesis was derived from 
the Resource Curse theory that nations overwhelmingly reliant on a national 
resource are more likely to suffer from greater political violence.  Funds gained 
from natural resources sold in a volatile global market can cause significant 
swings in the wealth of a nation, eroding the regime’s reputation for providing and 
protecting its people.  The wealth from natural resources can also diminish a 
population’s propensity for demanding better representation.  Instead, they are 
content to sit idly by as they enjoy the state’s welfare programs and totalitarian 
authority.  Yet the problem with fully attributing a case of political violence to a 
lack of economic diversity is that economic diversification may simply be a proxy 
for poor governance.  A solution to political violence that addresses only the 
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natural resource program may be missing the root of the problem and only 
perpetuate the instability within a country. 
The second hypothesis addressed the question of income inequality.  This 
argument is related to the Relative Deprivation theory, which argues that those 
who feel as if they deserve more than they have are sufficiently motivated to 
collective violent action.  The problem with this hypothesis is that it expects 
Morocco to be a more equal nation than Algeria due to its lower levels of political 
violence.  Evidence demonstrates that this is not true.  Rather, Morocco has a 
higher GINI index, as well as a smaller percentage of the population holding a 
greater proportion of national income.  Both variables should indicate higher 
levels of political violence than observed in Algeria, a scenario that does not 
exist.  Therefore, the second hypothesis examined within this thesis fails in 
explaining the rate of occurrence of political violence in Morocco and Algeria. 
The third hypothesis argues that more political access will foster greater 
political stability.  Morocco has demonstrated that greater political openness 
combined with a gradual rate of democratization and reduced levels of political 
repression have contributed to greater political stability overall.  Yet there is more 
to Morocco’s success than a universal approach to democratization.   
Morocco and Algeria illustrate how violence can become ingrained in a 
society’s culture, making the challenge of eradicating violent action that much 
harder.  It appears that so many of the theories addressing the roots of political 
violence fail to fully capture the identity aspect, leaving the problem only half-
solved.  It is not enough to apply one solution to all countries and expect it to 
work.  Instead, addressing each nation individually with respect to its 
background, its social development and personal experiences with external 
actors may be a more appropriate approach and lead to more effective and 
relevant policies. 
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B. BUILDING AN IDENTITY OF PEACE 
It is puzzling how two nations with similar demographics, both former 
French colonies, and sharing an Arab-Berber heritage can be so divergent in 
their economic, political and social standings.  Most would assume the poorer of 
the two, Morocco, would be less stable and suffer from more political violence yet 
this thesis has demonstrated that is not the case.  Most of the existing theories 
on political violence attempt to attribute the frequency and scale of political 
violence to a single variable, whether it is poverty, abundant natural resources or 
income inequality.  The political process theory takes into account how much 
access the public has to influence policy, the rate of democratization and the 
state’s repression of its people. 
What is most worrisome is not which factor Western leadership blames for 
civil wars, massacres and other forms of political violence.  Instead, it is the 
universal approach the West takes to address all struggling nations.  Nation 
building may involve several common tactics, but the unique circumstances 
informing that nation’s identity cannot be discounted.  However, Morocco and 
Algeria’s national identities and how those identities were formed may also play a 
role in explaining why Algeria suffers from more political violence than Morocco. 
Identity influences all matters of life and without a sense of who you are, it 
is easy to resort to destructive behavior.  Algeria was victimized by its colonial 
occupiers and its culture was deemed inferior to French society.  Therefore, it is 
logical that the Algerians were wandering aimlessly and began grasping at any 
sense of cultural identity to distinguish themselves from their colonial past.  
Unfortunately, violent action became an accepted form of expression for 
Algerians and neither their political nor their economic circumstances were 
effective in establishing stable customs. 
Morocco and Algeria have developed very different responses to conflict 
dating back to early encounters with invading forces.  Morocco was originally 
inhabited by indigenous peoples who were largely protected from external 
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influences by the ocean and Rif Mountains.200  As the Arab-Islam influence 
spread during the Seventh and Eighth Centuries, Morocco was not immune to 
the ideology and culture.  The end result was the formation of a new Islamic 
nation ruled over by succeeding dynasties.  While her neighbors were 
incorporated into the Ottoman Empire, Morocco was able to integrate much of its 
original identity and maintain its monarchy’s dynastic rule.201 
In comparison to Morocco, Algeria’s history of violence is significantly 
more robust, enduring and frequent.  This dichotomy may suggest that a people 
consistently exposed and subjected to indiscriminate violence eventually become 
desensitized to its shocking and terrifying nation.  The result is escalating 
violence in a desperate attempt to be relevant and a people whose only recourse 
is violence. Muller suggested that a history of violent behavior could influence the 
continued use of violence in the future.  The rationale is people learn that violent 
behavior can be successful and rewarding, and so they are more likely “to accept 
violence as a form of conflict behavior in the future.”202  This may lead to one 
explanation for the frequency and degree of violence observed throughout 
Algeria’s history. 
Without a doubt Algeria’s experience with colonization was much more 
violent and demeaning than Morocco’s.  While Morocco was permitted to 
maintain control over its domestic institutions, the French completely restructured 
Algerian society.  As the French moved in, Algerian citizens were shoved aside 
and were treated atrociously.  The French abused and mistreated the Algerians, 
an act that continued for years and bred more inhumane treatment. Over the 
years the violent repression became “institutionalized” leaving little recourse for 
the battered Algerians.203  Assuming that “violence condemns those who 
                                            
200 Pennell, Morocco: From Empire to Independence, 24–26. 
201 Ibid., 81–83. 
202 Ted Robert Gurr, "On the Outcomes of Violent Conflict," in Handbook of Political Conflict 
(New York: The Free Press, 1980): 242. 
203 Ruedy, Modern Algeria, 50. 
 65 
experience it to repeat it forever”, it is likely that Algerians who have been more 
frequently and repeatedly subjected to violent action will tend to repeat this cycle 
and act out violently as well.204 
Algerians have become accustomed to living in violence and there is 
research that suggests such an environment encourages continued violence.  In 
situations of persistent violence, the popular attitude towards violence is more 
tolerant than in those where violence is less commonplace. The perpetrators of 
political violence in Algeria range from the state itself, small groups and even 
external forces, whether an official state like France or a non-government actor 
like AQIM.  Additionally, Algerians are active participants in global terrorism and 
were extremely active as anti-coalition fighters during Operation Iraqi 
Freedom.205 
Crenshaw postulates that the popular attitude toward terror is influenced 
by “the duration and magnitude of the terrorist danger.”206  The danger for those 
utilizing terror tactics is to over stimulate its target, thus rendering their shock and 
awe tactics “normal”.207  It is possible that Algeria’s population has actually 
enabled an atmosphere of violent tolerance.  Considering Algeria had a relatively 
more violent revolution from colonial France, its people were subject to more 
frequent and grotesque terrorist attacks.  Thus, they became more numb to its 
effects whereas the violence in Morocco was more sporadic and imposed a 
greater feeling of vulnerability and unpredictability.  There would be greater 
backlash towards such attacks and their instigators, whereas violent movements 
in Algeria have become part of the social scene, an accepted aspect of Algerian 
life.  What is worse, is that once the people are desensitized to repeated 
incidents of political violence, violent retaliation also becomes normal.  It feeds 
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into an ugly cycle that becomes difficult to break, leading to an ever more violent 
society. 
Morocco was better equipped to maintain its own national identity, both 
through the rule of the Ottoman Empire and French colonialism.  In addition, the 
issue of the Western Sahara also serves to unify a Moroccan identity against a 
specified “other” supposedly subservient population.  The violent activity in 
Morocco has almost always been between external actors and Morocco, whether 
the target was the state or civilian population.  Whether intentional or accidental, 
it is likely that instead of dividing the people, these violent incidents actually 
unified the people against a common enemy. 
John Ruedy describes early Algerian governance as “segmentary 
tribalism”, a characteristic the Algerians maintained even after the Arab-Islamic 
conquest.208  This type of governance is based on many tribes that are 
independently governed, similar to Ernest Gellner’s notion “divide that ye be not 
ruled”.209  However, the multiple divisions within the greater nation also led to 
higher levels of violence, as anarchy was prevalent with little unified identity or 
trust.210 
On the contrary, the violence observed in Algeria has almost always been 
divisive.  This is coupled with the fact that Algerians did not benefit from a unified 
identity under a revered monarch prior to colonization.  Rather its segmentary 
tribalism negated any need for a centralized government and the Ottoman 
Empire provided no such unity.  The issue became particularly potent as the FLN 
began to gain followers against colonial rule.  The idea of nationalism was 
foreign, as Algeria had no real national history or identity.211  As Algeria 
developed into an independent nation, violent action and a mass rebellion tore 
the country apart from within, pitting Algerians against each other.  When people 
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are consistently exposed to violence, they no longer benefit from the option of 
participating or not participating in collective violent action.  “Confronted with 
terrorism, a threatened person can no longer remain neutral or uninvolved in a 
conflict.”212  It is possible that the absence of a shared identity has contributed to 
the significant political stability issues still present in Algeria today. 
What becomes evident is that the people within each nation view violent 
action in different ways.  Moroccans try to avoid violent conflict and the 
government quickly rebukes those that engage in such action.  Contrarily, 
Algerians quickly resort to the use of violence to communicate their discontent 
and are often dealt with in an indiscriminate manner by the state.  Crenshaw 
suggests that violent action builds upon itself and so we can expect that in states 
in which violence is ingrained into the culture, we should expect further violence 
in the future.  What this implies is that nations that have a history of political 
violence cannot play by the same democratization rules as relatively more 
peaceful nations. 
“At the heart of the democratization issue in the Middle East is the 
question of national identity,” and Islam is a vital facet of the identities for most of 
those living in Morocco and Algeria.213  While it may be contrary to most 
contemporary news pundits, the inclusion of Islamism into national identity may 
actually serve to decrease the occurrence of violence.  Huntington claimed that 
Islamic nations were indistinguishable and all posed the same threat to Western 
civilization.  This approach should be quickly disregarded.  Instead, Western 
nations should stop viewing the MENA nations as smaller states of a larger 
conglomerate and rather as individual societies with their own unique nuances.  It 
is only in this manner that theories will be more fitting, policies will be more 
effective, and the potential for eliminating violent action even remotely possible. 
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A history of violence is extremely potent with these two cases studies.  It is 
a relentless circle of violence as those who witness and experience it are 
doomed to repeat the violent cycle.  Yet this is only part of the problem.  
Violence, whether criminal or political in nature, is not completely avoidable and 
continues to plague societies everywhere.  Yet the scope and frequency of 
political violence can be attributed to several key factors.  A strong government is 
necessary to quelling violence, but an indiscriminate heavy hand can have the 
opposite effect. 
Algeria is evidence of this fact, as its government has been much more 
oppressive and fails to distinguish between those responsible for the violence 
and innocent bystanders.  When innocent civilians and victims are subjected to 
the same punishments as those handed out to the perpetrators, a sense of 
injustice manifests and can grow into violent rebellion.  Morocco exhibits a better 
method of integrating democratic institutions while establishing clear boundaries 
for parties, individuals and the public.  These clear expectations, combined with 
gradual democratization and swift punishments for violent actors, have 
succeeded in a less volatile environment. 
Morocco and Algeria are two case studies within North Africa but offer 
lessons for all developing nations struggling with bouts of political violence, 
whether brief or sustained.  The answer is not for developed nations to pour in 
international aid combined with Western policies, but for the states to address the 
needs of their people.  Past violence, as well as violence handed down from the 
government, breeds more violence and instability. 
Morocco and Algeria may appear to be synonymous due to their shared 
cultural foundations, colonial histories and struggles with Islamism.  However, 
each nation has developed its own identity with respect to the use of violence as 
well as their attitude towards external intervention.  Solutions for political violence 
need to be tailored to each nation and its own unique circumstances as opposed 
to a one size fits all solution. 
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C. IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE 
The recent Arab Spring and the global reactions demonstrate the currency 
of this thesis and its potential policy implications.  The success in Morocco’s 
ability to promote political stability should be attributed to its individual 
characteristics.  This thesis suggests that the West should not expect a method 
to work in Tunisia because it was successful in Egypt.  Each nation in North 
Africa has cultivated its own identity with respect to its unique history and 
experiences.  The West is doing itself and the nations it is trying to help a 
disservice by ignoring the characteristics that define that nation. 
Economic aid is desirable because it is easy money, but it creates a 
dependency on those who give it.  Instead, Western governments should heed 
the lessons learned from the puzzle of Morocco and Algeria.  Economic 
diversification and aid are not enough to stabilize a tumultuous political 
environment.  It is important for struggling nations to cultivate a national identity 
that speaks to the country as a whole.  Rather than Western nations jockey for 
credit for any successes, these successes should be turned over to the nation in 
need.  Building an identity of self-reliance will do more to stabilize the violent 
environment than dependence on foreign intervention. 
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